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EDWARD G. MASCOLO· 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Illinois v. Gates,) a sharply divided Supreme Court articu­
lated a new, more flexible standard for evaluating the facial suffi­
ciency of supporting affidavits for warrants based on hearsay 
evidence contained in informant's tips. In doing so, the Court re­
jected a rigid application of the two-pronged test established inAgui
lor v. Texas 2 and Spinelli v. United States,3 replacing it with a 
totality-of-the-circumstances approach that placed strong emphasis 
upon a practical and commonsense assessment of the existence of 
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant.4 
It is the thesis of this article that the result reached in Gates, 
and, in particular, the underlying theme implicit in the Court's ra­
tionale, constitutes, collectively, a wholesale assault upon the contin­
ued vitality of the fourth amendment of the United States 
Constitution.s Further, it is the contention of this study that in es­
pousing the cause of common sense and effective law enforcement, 
the Court in Gates embarked upon a course that can result only in a 
• Research attorney, Office of Judicial Education, Judicial Department, State of 
Connecticut; member of the Connecticut and District of Columbia Bars; Editor-in-Chief 
of the CONNECTICUT BAR JOURNAL, 1969-73; current member of the CONNECTICUT BAR 
JOURNAL Editorial Board; B.A., Wesleyan University, 1949; LL.B., Georgetown Univer­
sity, 1952. The opinions expressed herein are those of the author alone. 
1. 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983). 
2. 378 U.S. 108 (1964). 
3. 393 U.S. 410 (1969). 
4. 103 S. Ct. at 2332; see United States v. Kolodziej, 712 F.2d 975, 977 (5th Cir. 
1983)(per curiam). 
5. U.S. CONST. amend. IV: 

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 

against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no War­

rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or thingg 
to be seized. 
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diminished role for judicial officers in making determinations of 
probable cause; in a reduction of the independence and integrity of 
the magistrates in the warrant process, and in a lowered standard of 
probable cause for the issuance of warrants under the fourth amend­
ment. The net result will be an evisceration of the core value of 
human dignity and personal liberty secured by the amendment. 
This article will first review the function served by probable 
cause in protecting the individual's security and privacy from arbi­
trary intrusions by government agents, and the crucial role per­
formed by an independent judiciary in preserving the standard of 
probable cause. An examination of the reasoned concern on the 
Supreme Court for the continued vitality of an independent judici­
ary that led to the establishment of the Agui/ar-Spinelli rules will also 
be reviewed in the context of their purpose: to guide magistrates in 
making proper determinations of probable cause in cases involving 
hearsay reports of criminal activity received by the police from infor­
mants. This examina~ion will reveal, however, that the two-pronged 
test articulated by Agui/ar-Spinelli-to implement the general consti­
tutional requirement that probable cause determinations are to be 
made by neutral and detached magistrates, and not by law enforce­
ment officers-was being applied in an overly-technical manner by 
certain courts. This insistence upon rigid application of the Agui/ar­
Spinelli rules laid the ideological groundwork for the decision in 
Gates. 
The Gates decision and the separate and concurring opinions 
registered by four members of the Court will be reviewed in detail. 
An analysis and critique of the position adopted by the majority in 
Gates will demonstrate that the majority position will lead to a dis­
mantlement of the "warrant machinery contemplated by the [flourth 
[a]mendment."6 This article concludes with a call to the states to re­
ject, under the authority of their own constitutions, the suggestion 
("invitation" may be a more accurate term) implicit in Gates to dras­
tically reduce the security of the individual from arbitrary and un­
warranted intrusions upon his privacy by government agents. 
Although this article discusses the past, it is not about the past. 
Rather, it is about the present, and a portent of what lies ahead for 
fourth amendment jurisprudence. It does not end on a pessimistic 
note, however, but rather in a firm belief that the decision in Gates 
will afford the states an opportunity to reassert the continued vitality 
6. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532 (1967). 
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of personal security from unreasonable searches and seizures under 
state law. 
II. PROBABLE CAUSE AND AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY 
The genius of the American constitutional scheme lies in its sep­
aration of powers and its concomitant insistence upon an independ­
ent judiciary. The role ofthe judiciary has been to guard against the 
excesses of the coordinate branches of government by preserving the 
supremacy of the Constitution through the rule of law and the judi­
ciary's power to invalidate any executive or legislative act in conflict 
with the fundamental law of the land.7 The need for judicial inde­
pendence has particular relevance to the dictates of the fourth 
amendment, and to the protections that it secures.8 
Lying at the "core" of fourth amendment interests is the secur­
ity of an individual's privacy against unwarranted intrusions by of­
ficers of the state.9 Because of the fundamental nature of this 
guarantee, it has been characterized as being "basic" to a free and 
democratic society.lO 
The fourth amendment operates as a limitation upon the official 
exercise of power I I by erecting a "constitutional barrier" between 
citizen and government. 12 By imposing a standard of reasonable­
ness 13 upon the exercise of discretion by law enforcement officers, 
7. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703-09 (1974); United States v. 
Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 442-46 & n.20, 462 (1965); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. 
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638-40 (1943); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch ) 137, 163, 
173-80 (1803); I. BRANT, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: ITS ORlGlN AND MEANING 8-10 (1965); 
G. DU;TZE, THE FEDERALIST: A CLASSIC ON FEDERALISM AND FREE GOVERNMENT 
171-75 & n.191 (1960); THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 491-92 (A. Hamilton) (B. Wright ed. 
1961); Id. No. 81, at 506-07; T. JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 123-24 
(1832); see also J. Frese, Writs of Assistance in the American Colonies (1660-1776) 196­
97,296-97 (1951) (unpublished manuscript) (available in Harvard University Archives, 
Pusey Library) (real significance of the opposition to executive abuses associated with the 
writs of assistance was the constitutional stand taken by the American colonists: that acts 
of Parliament in violation of the natural and the common law were void, and that it was 
the office of the judiciary to invalidate them). 
8. See Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 110-15; Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 
(1948). 
9. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949); accord, Schmerber v. California, 384 
U.S. 757, 767 (1966). 
10. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949). 
II. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 392 (1971); see United 
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554 (1976); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 28-29 
(1968); Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amentment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 353, 
400 (1974). 
12. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451,455 (1948). 
13. The touchstone of fourth amendment analysis is the reasonableness, in the 
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the amendment preserves privacy interests of individuals against ar­
bitrary interference by the state. 14 The standard of reasonableness 
requires that the facts relied upon to justify an intrusion "be capable 
of measurement against 'an objective standard,' whether this be 
probable cause or a less stringent test."15 Similarly, a determination 
of probable cause must be based on "objective facts" that justify the 
issuance of a warrant by a magistrate, and "not merely on the sub­
jective good faith of the police" .16 This ensures that an individual's 
security and privacy interests are not subject to the discretionary 
mercy of law enforcement officials.17 
A critical component of the reasonableness standard is the re­
quirement of probable cause. IS The central importance of requiring 
light of the surrounding circumstances, of the particular governmental intrusion of an 
individual's privacy and security. See Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3481 (1983); 
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-09 (1977) (per curiam); United States v. 
Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1,9 (1977); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 19 (1968). Reasonableness, in 
the setting of police activity subject to fourth amendment strictures, will be determined 
on the basis of a balance between the public interest in effective law enforcement and the 
individual's right to be secure from arbitrary interference by government agents. See 
United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. 2573,2579 (1983); Mimms, 434 U.S. at 
109;-United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975); Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-21; 
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-35, 536-37 (1967). 
14. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,653-54 (1979); see United States v. Menden­
hall, 446 U.S. 544, 553-54 (1980) (plurality opinion); Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 
307,312 (1978); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554 (1976); Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 19 (1968); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967). 
One commentator, however, has argued that the fourth amendment was less a re­
sponse to privacy concerns than it was a harbinger of equal protection values. The thesis 
here is that the framers were concerned that law enforcement officers would discriminate 
between the privileged and the poor in determining whose lives and homes would be 
disrupted in ferreting out crime. Ely, Toward a Representation-Reinforcing Mode ofJudi­
cial Review, 37 MD. L. REV. 451, 481-82 (1978). 
IS. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,654 (1979); see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,21­
22 (1968). 
16. Unites States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 808 (1982); see Carroll v. United States, 
267 U.S. 132, 161-62 (1925); Director General v. Kastenbaum, 263 U.S. 25, 28 (1923). 
17. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654-55 (1979); Camara v. Municipal Court, 
387 U.S. 523, 532 (1967); Aguilar, 278 U.S. at 1I0-11. 
18. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 207-16 (1979) (warrantless full-scale 
arrests constitutionally unreasonable unless supported by probable cause); United States 
v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 107 (1965) (a warrant may issue only upon probable cause); 
United States v. Slay, 714 F.2d 1093, 1095 (lith Cir. 1983) (per curiam) ("search warrant 
must be supported by probable cause"); United States v. Tate, 694 F.2d 1217, 1219 (9th 
Cir. 1982) (to comply with constitutional precepts, search warrants must be based on 
probable cause); N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 129 (1937); see also Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. I, 20 (1968) (dictum) ("If this case involved police conduct subject to the 
[wlarrant [cllause of the [f]ourth [almendment, we would have to ascertain whether 
'probable cause' existed to justify the search and seizure which took place"); if. Florida 
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probable cause for reasonable searches and seizures under the fourth 
amendment is to safeguard the privacy concerns of citizens from ar­
bitrary intrusions by the police. 19 It is "the standard by which pri­
vacy is reasonably invaded,"20 for it establishes the criteria for 
testing a particular decision to search or seize against the constitu­
tional precept of reasonableness.21 
At the same time, the criteria established for the existence of 
probable cause seek to accommodate the competing interests of soci­
ety in effective law enforcement. Thus, probable cause has served as 
an effective compromise for accommodating the often opposing in­
terests of the individual and society.22 This standard has embodied 
"the accumulated wisdom ofprecedent and experience as to the min­
imum justification necessary to make the kind of intrusion involved 
in [search-and-seizure activity] 'reasonable' under the [flourth 
[a]mendment."23 To require more would unduly hamper effective 
law enforcement, while sanctioning less would subject the privacy 
interests of the individual to the capricious mercy of government 
agents.24 
As this analysis has demonstrated, the existence of probable 
cause is crucial to the vitality of the fourth amendment. But, the 
requirement that such cause satisfy the concept of resonableness 
under the amendment would be an empty gesture if the determina­
tion were left to the subjective good faith of law enforcement officers. 
It is in this particular setting that "the warrant machinery contem­
v. Royer, 103 S. Ct 1319, 1325 (1983) (plurality opinion) (full-scale arrests and full-blown 
searches on suspicion are violative of the fourth amendment). 
19. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208, 213 (1979); Brinegar v. United 
States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949). The requirement of probable cause for reasonable 
searches and seizures is specifically mandated by the warrant clause of the fourth amend­
ment, which established "the root principle of judicial superintendence of searches and 
seizures." Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 454 n.6 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
20. Mascolo, Specificity Requirementsfor Warrants Under The Fourth Amendment: 
Defining the Zone ofPrivacy, 73 DICK. L. REV. 1,6 (1968); see N. LASSON, supra note 18, 
at 120. 
21. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534 (1967). For an analysis of the 
''working relationship" between probable cause and the requirement of specificity for 
warrants, see Mascolo, supra note 20, at 5-7. 
22. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208 (1979) (quoting Brinegar v. United 
States, 338 U.S. 160,176 (1949»; Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103,112 (1975) (standard of 
probable cause "represents a necessary accommodation between the individual's right to 
liberty and the [s)tate's duty to control crime"). 
23. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208 (1979). 
24. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949); see Camara v. Municipal 
Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532-33 (1967); Aguilar, 378 U.S. at IIO-ll; McDonald v. United 
States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-56 (1948); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948). 
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plated by the [f]ourth [a]mendment"2S takes on added significance. 
The general command of fourth amendment jurisprudence is 
the requirement of a warrant.26 The insistence upon the presence of 
a warrant acknowledges the significant role played by the judicial 
warrant in the constitutional scheme of protecting the individual 
from arbitrary governmental intrusions upon his security and pri­
vacy.27 In the first place, the requirement of a warrant provides the 
detached scrutiny of an impartial magistrate to make the all-impor­
tant determination of probable cause. It entrusts to a judicial officer 
the task of assessing the quantum of evidence that will justify a 
breach of an individual's zone ofprivacy.28 Ferreting out crime was 
deemed too competitive an enterprise to qualify zealous law enforce­
ment officers for the degree of detachment and objectivity required 
for reasonable assessments of probable cause. As a result, the fourth 
amendment interposes a magistrate between the citizen and the po­
lice, in the belief that an objective mind might better determine the 
need to invade the individual's security and privacy in order to en­
force the law.29 Thus, a determination of probable cause must be 
based on "objective facts" that justify the issuance of a warrant by a 
magistrate, and "not merely on the subjective good faith" of govem­
.=' 
ment agents.30 
The second purpose served by the warrant requirement is that it 
defines and limits the scope of intrusion that law enforcement of­
25. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532 (1967). 
26. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824-25 (1982); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 
U.S. 385, 390 (1978); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (subject only to "a 
few" exceptions, warrantless searches are per se unreasonable). 
27. See United States v. Lockett, 674 F.2d 843, 845-46 (lith Cir. 1982). 
28. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1,9 (1977); United States v. Martinez­
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 566 (1976)(a crucial purpose of the warrant requirement is the 
substitution of the judgment of an impartial magistrate for that of the police); Schmerber 
v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966) (requirement that a warrant be obtained is a 
requirement that the inferences to support a search or seizure be drawn by an impartial 
judicial officer and not by zealous law enforcement officers); J. HALL, SEARCH AND 
SEIZURE § 6:4, at 182-83 (1982 & Supp. 1983). 
29. See Gales, 103 S. Ct. at 2351-52, 2355, 2356 n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Agui­
lor, 378 U.S. at 110-15 (A contrary rule would leave the security of individual privacy at 
the discretionary mercy of police officers, and would undermine the independence of the 
magistrate.); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-56 (1948) (right of privacy 
deemed too precious to be entrusted to the discretion of law officers); Johnson v. United 
States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932) 
(protection against unlawful searches more likely to be obtained by resort to search war­
rants than by reliance upon the "sagacity of petty officers" acting under the "excitement" 
attendant upon the capture of persons accused of crime); J. HALL, supra note 28, § 6:3, at 
178-79. 
30. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 808 (1982). 
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ficers are permitted to make, thereby increasing the probability that 
a particular search or seizure, once commenced, will not exceed the 
bounds of reasonableness.31 Finally, the presence of a warrant as­
sures the individual, whose security and privacy have been invaded, 
of the lawful authority of the executing officer, his need to intrude 
upon the individual's security and privacy, and the limits of his 
power to do SO.32 
The right not to be searched or seized without a neutral decision 
that probable cause exists is basic to a free and enlightened society. 
This guarantee, by removing from the discretion of law officers the 
determination as to what evidence justifies an invasion of the indi­
vidual's privacy, and entrusting it to a judicial officer,33 seeks to im­
plement the prime aim and purpose of the fourth amendment: 
personal security from unreasonable governmental intrusions upon 
the privacy of the individual,34 Thus, the framers of the fourth 
amendment placed their trust in the neutral magistrate, who, by ju­
dicious use of the warrant power, would endeavor to strike the 
proper balance between the privacy interests of the individual and 
the concerns of society for effective law enforcement.35 But, this 
trust implicitly rejected any acquiescent or secondary role for the 
magistrate. To the contrary, his role was to be central to the issuance 
of warrants, . and would not allow for unquestioning or rubber­
stamped deference to the judgment of police officers.36 This meant, 
at a minimum, that the magistrate would insist upon a substantial 
basis for a judicial determination that probable cause existed.37 
Mere conc1usory allegations of wrongdoing, as the Supreme Court 
has observed, are not sufficient. 38 
InNathanson v. United States ,39 the Supreme Court held for the 
first time that a warrant that is issued on the basis of a supporting 
affidavit, that shows no facts upon which to base a finding of prob­
31. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1,9 (1977). 
32. Jd.; Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532 (1967). 
33. See J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT: A 
STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 47 (1966); N. LASSON, supra note 18, at 
120. 
34. See United States v. Poller,43 F.2d 911, 914 (2d Cir. 1930) (L. Hand, J.); T. 
TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 68 (1969). 
35. J. LANDYNSKI, supra note 33, at 47. 
36. See Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 110-15; Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 486 
(1958); J. HALL, supra note 28, § 6:5, at 183. 
37. See Gales, 103 S. Ct. at 2332. 
38. See Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 564-65 (1971); United States v. Ven­
tresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108-09 (1965) (dictum). 
39. 290 U.S. 41 (1933). 
338 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:331 
able cause, is unreasonable under the fourth amendment.40 The 
Court reasoned that since a valid warrant must be supported by 
probable cause, this standard could be satisfied only if a judicial of­
ficer found such cause from the "facts or circumstances presented to 
him under oath or affirmation."41 
The Nathanson Court distinguished Locke v. United States ,42 
upon which the government relied, by noting that Locke was a pro­
ceeding to forfeit a cargo of goods seized for violation of the revenue 
laws. "It presented," the Court observed, "no question concerning 
the validity of a warrant."43 Moreover, the government could take 
nothing from the fact that the Locke search involved the seizure of 
goods smuggled into the country in fraud of the revenue laws. While 
the practice of sanctioning searches for such contraband on the basis 
of affidavits ofsuspicion or belief has "been sustained from the earli­
est times," the search in Nathanson was of a private residence.44 In 
the judgment of the Court, there was "nothing in [the revenue] stat­
utes [governing smuggled goods that] indicate[d] that a warrant to 
search a private dwelling [might] rest upon mere affirmance of suspi­
cion or belief without disclosure of supporting facts or 
circumstances."45 
Nathanson, then, stands for the principle that mere conclusory 
allegations of wrongdoing are insufficient to show or establish prob­
able cause. 
The Supreme Court affirmed the Nathanson principle in Gior­
denello v. United States.46 The Court was confronted, once again, 
with a mere conclusory affidavit, in the form of a written complaint, 
under oath, for an arrest warrant pursuant to the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure.47 
The Court concluded that the complaint did "not pass [constitu­
tional] muster," because it did not provide any basis for a judicial 
determination that probable cause existed.48 The Court reasoned 
that fourth amendment principles governed applications for arrest 
warrants, as well as for search warrants, and that those principles 
40. Id. at 47. 
41. Id. 
42. II U.S. (7 Cranch) 339 (1813). 
43. 290 U.S. at 47. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. 
46. 357 U.S. 480 (1958). 
47. FED. R. CRIM. P. 3, 4. 
48. 357 U.S. at 486. 
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required that probable cause determinations be made by independ­
ent judicial officers.49 Simply put, it was not the function of the 
magistrate to accept "without question" mere conclusory statements 
by law officers of criminal wrongdoing. Rather, the Court thought 
that the magistrate "must judge for himself the persuasiveness of the 
facts relied on by a complaining officer to show probable cause."50 
Applying these criteria to the complaint at hand, the Giordenello 
Court found the complaint to be clearly deficient. It contained no 
"affirmative allegation" that the affiant had personal knowledge of 
the information given.51 Nor did the complaint "indicate any 
sources for the complainant's belief' of criminal activity. Finally, 
the complaint failed to "set forth any other sufficient basis upon 
which a finding of probable cause could be made."52 
The Court observed that it was difficult to understand how a 
judicial officer could independently assess the probability of crimi­
nal activity on the part of the defendant. 53 Indeed, concluded the 
Court, if such a complaint were upheld, the substantive protections 
surrounding the issuance of warrants would be seriously compro­
mised, and the complaint process would be "of only formal signifi­
cance, entitled to perfunctory approval" by a magistrate. 54 This, in 
the Court's opinion, ''would not comport with the protective pur­
poses which a complaint [or a supporting affidavit] is designed to 
achieve."s5 
Certain principles emerge from Nathanson and Giordenello. 
First, and foremost, is the independence and the integrity required of 
the reviewing magistrate. His role is both crucial and fundamental 
to the warrant process. Not only must he not passively defer to the 
subjective requests of law officers, but also he should not sanction 
any attempt from any source to usurp the functions of his office. If 
the commands of the fourth amendment are to have any meaning, 
then, clearly, an independent and viably functional judiciary must 
be interposed between the police and the citizenry. To do otherwise 
would reduce probable cause determinations to subjective assess­
ments colored by the competitive zeal of law enforcement officers. 56 
49. Id. at 485-86. 
50. Id at 486. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. 
53. Id at 486-87. 
54. Id. at 487. 
55. Id. 
56. See Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 110-15; McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455­
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This, in tum, would lead to a reduced expectation of privacy on the 
part of the individual; for, if an individual is protected in the knowl­
edge that his privacy interests are only as secure as the police desire 
them to be, then that individual is protected in name only. The Con­
stitution was intended to be more than mere words, and was never 
intended to convey empty promises. Thus, an independent judiciary 
secures for the individual both the procedural and the substantive 
guarantees of the Constitution. This, in substance, is the cardinal 
tenet of Nathanson-Giordenello. 
Closely allied to this is the second command ofNathanson-Gior­
denello. If an independent judiciary is to discharge its role of objec­
tively determining when the privacy interests of the individual are to 
be subordinated to the effective enforcement of the criminal laws, 
then the judiciary must be provided with a substantial factual basis 
upon which to predicate its decision. It is here that the role of prob­
able cause is crucial to the warrant process, for it is "the standard by 
which privacy is reasonably invaded."57 Probable cause cannot be 
based on mere conclusions, suppositions, or suspicions. As is true of 
other constitutional protections, the standard of probable cause is 
one of substance and meaning. This standard was not satisfied by the 
"bare bones" affidavits contained in Nathanson and Giordenello. 
Consequently, the magistrate was prevented from truly discharging 
his constitutional role of objectively determining whether there was 
sufficient cause to justify a reasonable intrusion upon the individ­
ual's privacy interests. 
Aguilar-Spinelli represented a serious effort by the Supreme 
Court to implement the commands ofNathanson and Giordenello, by 
requiring law officers to provide certain information to magistrates, 
and by structuring probable cause inquiries in a manner that would 
assure the independence of the judiciary as well as ensure a greater 
degree of accuracy in probable cause determinations. The focal 
point of inquiry inAguilar-Spinelli was the troublesome area of hear­
say evidence contained in tips received by the police from 
informants. 
56 (1948); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948); United States v. Leftowitz, 
285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932). 
57. Mascolo, supra note 20, at 6 (emphasis added). 
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III. AGUILAR-SPINELLI 
A. Aguilar v, Texas 
InAguilar v. Texas,58 the Supreme Court was required to assess 
the constitutional sufficiency of a supporting affidavit for a search 
warrant that, in relevant part, recited that the affiants "received relia­
ble information from a credible person and do believe that. . . nar­
cotics. . . are being [illegally] kept at the above described premises 
"59 
The Court began its discussion with a reaffirmation of the prin­
ciple that searches conducted under the authority of a warrant" 'are 
to be preferred over the hurried action' " and discretionary judgment 
of law enforcement officers.60 A contrary rule would reduce the 
fourth amendment" 'to a nullity,' "61 compromise the security inter­
ests of the individual against unreasonable searches,62 and discour­
age resort to warrants.63 Thus, when a search is conducted under the 
authority of a warrant, a "reviewing court[] will accept evidence of a 
less Judicially competent or persuasive character than would have 
justified an officer in acting. . . without a warrant'. . . and will sus­
tain the judicial determination [of probable cause provided] 'there 
was [a] substantial basis for [the magistrate] to [have] conc1ud[ed]' " 
that probable cause existed.64 
The Court then sounded a cautionary note that, while a review­
ing court would pay "substantial deference to judicial determina­
tions of probable cause," the magistrate would still be required to 
"perform his 'neutral and detached' function and [should] not serve 
merely as a rubber stamp for the police."65 
Applying these principles to the case at hand, the Court con­
cluded that the affidavit under review was constitutionally deficient 
and suffered from the same conclusory vice that had infected the 
58. 378 U.S. 108 (1964). 
59. Id. at 109 (footnote omitted). 
60. Id. at 1I0-ll (quoting United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932». 
61. 378 U.S. at III (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948». 
62. See 378 U.S. at Ill; if. United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932) 
(security against illegal searches "more likely to be attained by resort to search warrants 
than by reliance upon the caution and sagacity of petty officers"). 
63. 378 U.S. at III; if. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 270 (1960) (if a peace 
officer had to present evidence "of a more judicially competent or persuasive character" 
to obtain a warrant than would have justified his "acting on his own without a warrant," 
resort to warrants "would ultimately be discouraged"). 
64. 378 U.S. at III (quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 (1960». 
65. Id. 
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affidavits in Nathanson and Giordenello.66 The mere affirmance of 
belief that the defendant possessed narcotics was not the belief of the 
affiants themselves; it was that of an unidentified informant.67 
Moreover, the affidavit contained" 'no affirmative allegation that 
the affiant[s] [had] personal knowledge of the matters contained 
therein.' "68 In fact, noted the Court, the affidavit did not even con­
tain an affirmative claim or allegation that the unidentified inform­
ant had such knowledge.69 "For all that appears," commented the 
Court, the informant "merely suspected, believed or concluded" that 
the defendant had narcotics in his possession.70 This was simply an 
inadequate basis upon which the reviewing magistrate could be ex­
pected to assess independently the existence of probable cause. 
Hence, "he [must have] necessarily accepted 'without question' the 
informant's... 'mere conclusion.' "71 
To guard against such deficiencies, and to prevent their reoccur­
rence, the Court held that a reviewing magistrate "must be informed 
of some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant 
concluded" that evidence subject to seizure was where he said it was, 
and "some of the underlying circumstances" from which the affiant 
concluded that the informant "was 'credible' or his information 'reli­
able.'''72 Otherwise, the Court feared, "'the inferences from the 
facts which lead to the complaint' " will be drawn, not by the neutral 
and detached magistrate as required by the Constitution, but, rather, 
by police officers "'engaged in the often competitive enterprise of 
ferreting out crime,' " or worse, by informants.73 
The Court, in Aguilar, thus established a two-pronged test to 
implement the constitutional requirement that probable cause deter­
minations be made by neutral and detached magistrates, and not by 
law enforcement officers,74 and to assess the legal sufficiency, pursu­
ant to the standard of probable cause, of an informant's tip. These 
prongs have come to be known, respectively, as the "basis-of-knowl­
66. Id. at Il2-15. 
67. Id. at lB. 
68. Id. (quoting Giordenello, 357 U.S. at 486). 
69. Id. at 113; see Giordenello, 357 U.S. at 486. 
70. 378 U.S. at 113-14. 
71. Id. at 114; see Giordenello, 357 U.S. at 486-87. 
72. 378 U.S. at 114 (footnote omitted). 
73. Id. at 114-15 (quoting Giordenello, 357 U.S. at 486; and Johnson v. United 
States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948». 
74. Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 415-16. 
343 1983) PROBABLE CAUSE AFTER GATES 
edge" prong and the "veracity" prong.75 
The basis-of-knowledge prong, on the one hand, requires that 
the supporting affidavit disclose the underlying circumstances from 
which the informer drew his conclusion of criminal wrongdoing so 
as to permit an objective evaluation by an independent judicial of­
ficer.76 The veracity prong, on the other hand, requires that the reli­
ability of the informant be shown or established.77 
As to the basis-of-knowledge prong, an affidavit based on an 
informant's tip or report, standing alone, will not provide probable 
cause for the issuance of a search warrant, unless the tip includes 
information that apprises the reviewing magistrate of the informer's 
basis for concluding that the evidence subject to seizure is where he 
claims it is.78 A statement from the informant that he personally 
observed the criminal activity in question would be sufficient or, if 
the informant came by his information indirectly, and provided a 
satisfactory explanation as to why his sources were reliable, then the 
prong would be satisfied.79 In the absence of a statement detailing 
the circumstances in which the information had been obtained or 
gathered, the basis-of-knowledge prong may nevertheless be satisfied 
by a detailed description of the defendant's criminal activity from 
which the magistrate may reasonably infer that the informer was re­
lying upon something more substantial than a casual rumor or an 
individual's general reputation.80 
The veracity prong requires that the affiant inform the magis­
75. E.g., United States v. Sellers, 483 F.2d 37, 39-40 (5th Cu. 1973), cerl. denied, 
417 U.S. 908 (1974). 
76. Id. 
77. Id. 
78. Gales, 103 S. Ct. at 2347 (White, J., concurring in the judgment); see Spinelli, 
393 U.S. at 412-13,416; United States v. Marino, 682 F.2d 449,452 (3d Cu. 1982). 
79. 103 S. Ct. at 2347 n.20 (White, J., concurring in the judgment); see United 
States v. Marino, 682 F.2d 449, 453 (3d Cu. 1982). 
80. Gales, 103 S. Ct. at 2347 n.20 (White, J., concurring in the judgment); Spinelli, 
393 U.S. at 416-17; United States v. Anderson, 500 F.2d 1311, 1315 (5th Cu. 1974); 
United States v. Sellers, 483 F.2d 37, 40-41 (5th Cu. 1973), cerl. denied, 417 U.S. 908 
(1974). 
It has been argued that independent corroboration should not be considered by a 
magistrate in applying the basis-of-knowledge prong, because while corroboration may 
indicate an informant's truthfulness, it will not establish that his knowledge has been 
obtained in a reliable way. Stanley v. State, 19 Md. App. 507, 531-33, 313 A.2d 847, 861­
62, cerl. denied, 271 Md. 745 (1974); Note, The Informer's Tip as Probable Cause for 
Search or Arresl, 54 CORNELL L. REv. 958, 963 n.30 (1969). But, surely, corroboration, 
where shown in substantial detail suggestive of inside information, should be sufficient to 
permit a magistrate to reasonably infer both veracity and reliability. See Gales, 103 S. 
Ct. at 2349 n.22 (White, J., concurring in the judgment); Draper v. United States, 358 
U.S. 307, 313 (1959). 
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trate of his basis for concluding or believing that the informant is 
credible, or that the informant's information is reliable.8l The relia­
bility of the tip may be verified by independent corroboration,82 or 
independent investigation.83 Such verification tends to dispel any 
notion that an informer's report has been fabricated.84 
The veracity prong may also be satisfied by a recitation in the 
affidavit that the informant previously supplied accurate information 
to the authorities.8s Alternatively, it may be satisfied by proof that 
the tip contains information against the informant's penal interest.86 
Under the Aguilar equation, probable cause for the issuance of 
a warrant may be based exclusively upon an informer's tip or report 
only if both the informant's basis of knowledge and his credibility 
are specified in the supporting affidavit.87 
B. Spinelli v. United States 
The Aguilar standards were refined and explicated in Spinelli v. 
United States ,88 which involved a somewhat detailed affidavit con­
taining both a tip from an anonymous informant and a report of an 
independent FBI investigation which partially corroborated the tip. 
The information imparted in the tip, however, was largely innocu­
ous, thereby making the informer's report a crucial element in the 
81. See Gales, 103 S. Ct. at 2347 (White, J., concurring in the judgment); Spinelli, 
393 U.S. at 412-13, 416; United States v. Marino, 682 F.2d 449,452 (3d Cir. 1982). 
82. United States v. One 56-Foot Motor Yacht Named the Tahuna, 702 F.2d 1276, 
1284 (9th Cir. 1983); see United States v. Anderson, 500 F.2d 1311, 1315-16 (5th Cir. 
1974). 
83. United States v. Prueitt, 540 F.2d 995, 1005 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 
U.S. 1063 (1977); see United States v. Anderson, 500 F.2d 1311, 1316 (5th Cir. 1974). 
84. See United States v. Anderson, 500 F.2d 1311, 1316 (5th Cir. 1974). 
85. Gales, 103 S. Ct. at 2347 n.20 (White, J., concurring in the judgment); United 
States v. Zucco, 694 F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 1982); United States v. Marino, 682 F.2d 449, 
453 (3d Cir. 1982); United States v. Swan, 545 F. Supp. 799, 807 (D. Del. 1982); see 
McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 303-04 (1967); United States v. Bagaric, 706 F.2d 42, 66 
(2d Cir. 1983). 
86. Gales, 103 S. Ct. at 2347 n.20 (White, J., concurring in the judgment); United 
States v. One 56-Foot Motor Yacht Named the Tahuna, 702 F.2d 1276, 1284 (9th Cir. 
1983)(dictum); see United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 583-84 (1971) (plurality 
opinion). 
87. United States v. Marino, 682 F.2d 449, 452 (3d Cir. 1982); United States v. 
Bush,647 F.2d 357, 362 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v. Hill, 500 F.2d 733, 739 (5th Cir. 
1974), cerl. denied, 420 U.S. 952 (1975); see United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 587-88 
(1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting); United States v. Sellers, 483 F.2d 37, 39 (5th Cir. 1973), 
cerl. denied, 417 U.S. 908 (1974) (affidavit must contain "sufficient objective assertions 
from which a detached magistrate may reasonably conclude that the hearsay should be 
credited"). 
88. 393 U.S. 410 (1969). 
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probable cause equation.89 
Because a magistrate reviewing a Spinelli-type affidavit would 
have to assess the probative value of the tip in conjunction with the 
independent law enforcement investigation, the Supreme Court first 
measured the informer's tip against the Aguilar standards,90 and 
found that the report received from the informant failed both prongs 
ofAguilar .91 . 
The first standard was not satisfied because there was no show­
ing of the informant's basis of knowledge. There was no way to de­
termine how the FBI's source had received his information ­
whether through direct observation or personal involvement in the 
defendant's bookmaking venture. Moreover, if the informer had 
come by the information indirectly, there was no explanation for 
why his own sources of information were reliable.92 
The Spinelli Court did recognize that, in the absence of a state­
ment detailing the manner in which the information had been gath­
ered, the basis-of-knowledge requirement could be satisfied by the 
detail of the informant's tip.93 But here, the Court cautioned, "it 
[was] especially important that the tip describe the ... criminal ac­
tivity in sufficient detail that the magistrate may know that he is rely­
ing on something more substantial than a casual rumor . . . or an 
accusation based merely on an individual's general reputation."94 
Thus, a magistrate, when presented with sufficient detail, will be able 
to reasonably infer that the informant had obtained his information 
in a reliable way.95 
The Court did not believe, however, that such an inference 
could be made "in the present case."96 The "only facts supplied" 
were that the defendant was using two specified telephones, and that 
these telephones were being employed in gambling operations. To 
the Court, "[t]his meager report could easily have been obtained 
from an ofiband remark heard at a neighborhood bar."97 
The Court also found that Aguilar's veracity prong had not 
been satisfied. Although the affiant had sworn that his source was 
89. See id. at 414-15. 
90. Id. at 415-16. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. at 416. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. at 417; see United States v. Smith, 598 F.2d 936, 939 (5th Cir. 1979). 
96. 393 U.S. at 417. 
97. Id. 
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" 'reliable' ", he offered the magistrate no supporting basis for this 
conclusion.98 
The Spinelli analysis supplemented the Aguilar requirements by 
addressing the question of whether the FBI's independent investiga­
tive efforts had been sufficiently successful to establish the inform­
ant's reliability. In so doing, the Court observed that a magistrate's 
constitutional responsibilities require that he rely on something more 
than an informant's report which fails, even when partially corrobo­
rated, to measure up to the Aguilar standards. Such a report is not as 
reliable as one which would satisfy theAguilar tests standing alone.99 
When it considered the allegations detailing the FBI's in­
dependent investigative efforts, the Court believed that "the patent 
doubts" that Aguilar raised concerning the tip's reliability had not 
been "adequately resolved."loo "At most," the Court observed, the 
allegations indicated only that the defendant could have used the 
telephones specified by the informer "for some purpose."101 But 
this, by itself, was siplply insufficient to support both the inference 
that the informant was "generally trustworthy" and that he had 
made his accusation on the basis of information obtained in a relia­
ble way.J02 More would be required to show that the informer "had 
not been fabricating his report out of whole cloth" and that the in­
formation was of the sort which "in common experience may be rec­
ognized as having been obtained in a reliable way."103 
The Court, in Spinelli, thus concluded that the tip, even when 
partially corroborated, was insufficient to provide the basis for a 
finding of probable cause. 104 This did not mean, however, that the 
tip could not properly have counted in the magistrate's determina­
tion. "Rather, it needed some further support."J05 This support, the 
Court believed, was lacking in the corroboration that was provided 
to the magistrate. In short, the Court could find "nothing alleged 
which would permit the suspicions engendered by the informant's 
report to ripen into a judgment that a crime was probably being 
committed."I06 To the contrary, the corroboration was of some "in­
98. Id. at 416. 
99. Id. at 415-16; see United States v. Smith, 598 F.2d 936, 938 (5th Cir. 1979). 
100. 393 U.S. at 417. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. at 417-18. 
104. Id. at 418. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. 
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nocent-seeming activity and data,"107 not criminal conduct, and 
thus failed to demonstrate reliability. lOS 
In concluding that the affidavit did not measure up to the Agui­
lar standards, the Court observed that it could not "sustain this war­
rant without diluting important safeguards that assure that the 
judgment of a disinterested judicial officer will interpose itself be­
tween the police and the citizenry."I09 
Justice White, concurring in Spinelli, was "inclined to agree 
with the majority" that there are "limited special circumstances in 
which an 'honest' informant's report, if sufficiently detailed, will in 
effect verify itself," so as to permit a reviewing magistrate to reason­
ably infer that the information had been obtained in a reliable 
way.110 But even when this is not the case, the tip can be sustained if 
it is supplemented by sufficient corroboration. Thus, to Justice 
White, verification of an informant's report "relates to the reliability 
of the source: because an informer is right about some things, he is 
more probably right about other facts, usually the critical, unverified 
facts."lll 
The Spinelli elaboration and refinement of the Aguilar tests pro­
vided that if an informant's report or tip failed under either or both 
of the two Aguilar prongs, probable cause could still be established 
by independent police investigatory work if it corroborated the tip to 
such an extent that it supported "both the inference that the informer 
107. Id. at 414. 
108. See id. at 417-19. 
109. Id. at 419 (footnote omitted). 
110. Id. at 425 (White, J., concurring in the judgment). 
111. Id. at 427. 
In his opinion concurring in the judgement in Gales, Justice White amplified upon 
his Spinelli concurrence by correcting Justice Brennan's interpretation, contained in the 
latter's dissent in Gales, 103 S. Ct. at 2354-55, of the Spinelli concurrence as "espousing 
the view that 'corroboration of certain details in a tip may be sufficient to satisfy the 
veracity, but not the basis of knowledge, prong ofAguilar.''' Justice White denied this, 
stating: 
I did not say that corroboration could never satisfy the basis of knowledge 
prong. My concern was, and still is, that the prong might be deemed satisfied 
on the basis of corroboration of information that does not in any way suggest 
that the informant had an adequate basis of knowledge for his report. If, how­
ever,. . .the police corroborat[ed) information from which it [could) be inferred 
that the informant's tip was grounded on inside information, this corroboration 
[would be) sufficient to satisfy the basis of knowledge prong ....The rules 
would indeed be strange if, as Justice Brennan suggest[ed) [in his Gales dissent, 
103 S. Ct. at 2356,) the basis of knowledge prong could be satisfied by detail in 
the tip alone, but not by independent police work. 
Id. at 2349 n.22 (White, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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was generally trustworthy and that he had made his charge. . . on 
the basis of information obtained in a reliable way."112 In addition, 
a sufficiently detailed tip may provide a proper foundation for a 
magistrate to conclude that the informant based his allegations on 
adequate or substantial knowledge, and not on mere rumor or suspi­
cion. l13 In instances in which law enforcement officers rely upon 
corroboration, the "ultimate question" will be whether the corrobo­
rated tip is as trustworthy as a tip that would satisfy the Aguilar re­
quirements without independent corroboration. I 14 
Under the Aguilar-Spinelli tests, an officer who applies for a 
warrant on the basis of an informant's tip or report must first show 
either that the informer is credible or that his information is reliable. 
Second, the applicant-affiant must set forth some of the facts upon 
which the informant based his conclusion or allegations of criminal 
activity. Finally, if the informant's tip fails to satisfy either or both of 
these tests, probable cause may still be established by independent 
police investigatory work that is sufficiently corroborative of the re­
port to make up or cOmpensate for any deficiencies contained in the 
report. I IS 
C. A Certain Rigidity in Applying Aguilar-Spinelli 
Although theAguilar-Spinelli rules enhanced the integrity of the 
warrant process by preserving the independence and objectivity of 
1l2. See Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2347-48 (White, J., concurring in the judgment); 
Spinel/i, 393 U.S. at 4.-7. 
113. See Spinel/i, 393 U.S. at 416-17; United States v. Zucco, 694 F.2d 44, 47 (2d 
Cir. 1982); United States v. Marino, 682 F.2d 449, 453 (3d Cir. 1982); United States v. 
Swan, 545 F. Supp. 799, 807 (D. Del. 1982). 
It has been argued, however, that since it is easy to fabricate even a wealth of detail, 
a defect in the veracity prong cannot be rehabilitated by self-verifying detail. Stanley v. 
State, 19 Md. App. 507, 533, 313 A.2d 847, 862, cert. denied, 271 Md. 745 (1974); J. HALL, 
supra note 28, § 5:20, at 163; Note, Probable Cause and the First-time Informer, 43 U. 
COLO. L. REv. 357, 362 (1972). But see United States V. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 589 (1971) 
(Harlan, J., dissenting)(suggesting that a wealth of detail may be sufficient to satisfy both 
the basis test and the trustworthiness test). 
According to one commentator, only corroboration of incriminating detail will suf­
fice to permit an inference of reliability. Note, supra, at 362; see J. HALL, supra note 28, 
§ 5:20, at 162-63. 
114. Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2348 (White, J., concurring in the judgment); see Spinelli, 
393 U.S. at 415. 
115. For further discussion of Aguilar-Spinelli, see J. HALL, supra note 28, at 
§§ 5:17-25; I W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMEND­
MENT § 3.3 (1978 and Supps. 1983, 1984); LaFave, Probable Causefrom Informants: The 
Effects ofMurphy's Law on Fourth Amendment Adjudication, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. I; Moy­
lan, Hearsay and Probable Cause: An Aguilar and Spinelli Primer, 25 MERCER L. REV. 
741 (1974); Note, supra note 113; Note, supra note 80. 
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the magistrate,1l6 they did generate controversy and a certain confu­
sion among the lower courts. This particularly arose from difficulties 
in properly applying the basis-of-knowledge prong. The result was, 
in the words of the Gates majority, "an excessively technical dissec­
tion of informants' tips"117 that "reflect[ed] a rigid application of [the 
Aguilar-Spinelli] rules."1l8 
Because the Gates majority singled out three lower-court deci­
sions119 as being reflective of such "rigid application," these cases 
warrant further attention as harbingers of the Gates decision. 
In Bridger v. State, 120 the court invalidated an affidavit which 
alleged that the defendant's apartment contained implements for the 
purpose of aiding in the commission of the crime of robbery with 
firearms. The basis for this information was a statement of McCall, 
an accomplice of the defendant in the specific bank robbery who had 
turned over to the officer-affiant $800.00 taken in the robbery. The 
informant stated that the defendant had the gun, a .38 caliber re­
volver, and two ski masks that had been used in the commission of 
the offense. These items, the affiant alleged, were hidden in the 
apartment. 121 
The Bridger court concluded that the affidavit demonstrated 
"no more than a suspicion on the part of the informer."122 The affi­
davit was deficient, reasoned the court, because it did not relate the 
basis of the informer's information, either by personal observation or 
incriminating statements, and because it did not provide "any other 
underlying facts or circumstances" that lent credence to the inform­
ant's report. 123 
116. See Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 415; if. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 
543, 566 (1976) (one purpose of the warrant requirement is to substitute the judgment of 
an impartial magistrate for that of the police). 
117. 103 S. Ct. at 2330 (footnote omitted). 
118. Id. at 2330 n.9. 
119. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority in Gales, cited People v. Brethauer, 
174 Colo. 29, 482 P.2d 369 (1971) (en bane); People v. Palanza, 55 Ill. App. 3d 1028,371 
N.E.2d 687 (1978); and Bridger v. State, 503 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974), as 
appropriate examples of "rigid application" that had been "brought to our attention by 
the [s]tate." 103 S. Ct. at 2330 n.9. Justice White also believed that Palanza and Bridger 
were "excellent examples of overly-technical applications of the Aguilar-Spinelli stan­
dard," and that the "holdings in these cases could easily be disapproved without reliance 
on a 'totality of the circumstances' analysis." Id. at 2350 n.26 (White, J., concurring). 
120. 503 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974). 
121. Id. at 803. 
122. Id. 
123. Id.• 
Personal observation by an informant of the facts contained in his tip will satisfy the 
basis-of-knowledge prong ofAguilar-Spinel/i. See Spinel/i, 393 U.S. at 416. It will also 
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The analysis of the Bridger affidavit was too narrow and unreal­
istic. 124 Viewed as a whole, the "total atmosphere"125 of the affida­
vit, the full import of the statement by the informant, McCall, was 
clearly against his penal interest, and carried its own indicia of credi­
bility for purposes of supporting a finding of probable cause. 126 In 
the first place, the statement established that the source of the infor­
mation was an accomplice of the defendant in the commission of a 
serious and violent felony - the armed robbery of a bank. Sec­
ondly, the informant had already turned over to the affiant part of 
the loot or criminal proceeds of his joint venture in crime with the 
defendant. This, in itself, confirmed the accuracy of his admitted 
involvement in the robbery, and lent credence to his claim that the 
implements used to aid in the commission of the offense were in fact 
hidden in the defendant's apartment. Furthermore, McCall de­
scribed the weapon used in the robbery as a .38 caliber revolver, and 
also described the two ski masks employed in the commission of the 
offense. Who was better qualified to do this than a participant in the 
crime? 
As to the reliability of the basis of McCall's information, this 
cou~d have been inferred readily and reasonably from the inform­
ant's unique relationship with the defendant. Thus, it would have 
been reasonable for the magistrate to have inferred that McCall had 
personally observed the revolver and the ski masks in the apartment, 
had witnessed their secretion in the apartment, or that the defendant 
himself had imparted this information. Obviously, the weapon and 
the masks were items of highly incriminating evidence, and it would 
have been perfectly natural for McCall and the defendant to have 
been concerned about their discovery by the police, and anxious to 
provide a place for their safekeeping. 127 
be sufficient to "establish the reliability of the evidence upon which the informer base[s) 
his conclusions" of wrongdoing. United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 589 (1971) 
(Harlan, J., dissenting). 
124. Cf. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965) (if the constitutional 
policy of according preference to searches and seizures under a warrant is to be served, 
then affidavits for warrants "must be tested and interpreted by magistrates and courts in 
a commonsense and realistic fashion"). 
125. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66 (1950). 
126. United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 583-84 (1971) (plurality opinion); 
United States v. One 56-Foot Motor Yacht Named the Tahuna, 702 F.2d 1276, 1284 (9th 
Cir. 1983) (dictum); see Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 425 (White, J., concurring in the judgment) 
("[I)f, for example, the informer's hearsay comes from one of the actors in the crime in 
the nature of admission against interest, the affidavit giving this information should be 
held sufficient."). 
127. See Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2348-49 (White, J., concurring in the judgment); 
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Granted that McCall was already in police custody and was un­
doubtedly anxious to curry favor with the authorities by making the 
best deal for himself. Nevertheless, these factors do not detract from 
the aura of credibility surrounding a statement that was clearly 
against McCall's penal interest. 128 
The second case cited by the Gates majority as reflecting a 
"rigid application" ofAguilar-Spinelli rules was People v. Palanza .129 
The Palanza affidavit, submitted in support of an application for a 
search warrant, stated that an informant of previous and demon­
strated reliability had seen, on specifically described premises, 
" 'within the past 72 hours,. . . a quantity of a white crystalline sub­
stance which was represented to the informant by a white male occu­
pant of the premises to be cocaine.' "130 Further, it was alleged that 
the informer " 'has observed cocaine on numerous occasions in the 
past,. . . is thoroughly familiar with its appearance[,]' " and "'that 
the white crystalline powder he observed in the. . . premises ap­
peared to him to be cocaine.' "13l 
ThePalanza court, noting that no question had been raised con­
cerning the reliability or credibility of the informant, 132 nevertheless 
ruled that the warrant was defective, because there was "no indica­
tion" as to how the informer, or any other person, could determine 
whether a particular substance was in fact cocaine "and not some 
other white substance such as sugar or salt."133 "Had the substance 
been unique in appearance," the court acknowledged, "we believe 
the complaint for a search warrant would have been sufficient."134 It 
would have been sufficient, according to the Palanza court, "even 
absent the uniqueness of the substance's appearance," had the in­
formant identified the occupant of the premises, who had repre­
sented the substance to be cocaine, to be one of the possessors of the 
substance, thereby establishing, "an admission against penal 
interests." 135 
By subjecting the affidavit to a hypercritical assessment, the 
Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 416-18; United States v. Sellers, 483 F.2d 37, 41 (5th Cir. 1973), cerl. 
denied, 417 U.S. 908 (1974); United States v. King, 564 F. Supp. 25, 29-30 (S.D.N.Y. 
1982). 
128. See United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 583-84 (1971) (plurality opinion). 
129. 55 Ill. App. 3d 1028,371 N.E.2d 687 (1978). 
130. Id. at 1029, 371 N.E.2d at 688. 
131. Id. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. at 1030, 371 N.E.2d at 689. 
134. Id. at 1031,371 N.E.2d at 689. 
135. Id. 
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Palanza court committed fundamental error. The court held that the 
affidavit had not satisfied Aguilar's basis-of-knowledge test. Yet, the 
affidavit had done just that. In formulating its two-pronged test in 
Aguilar, the Supreme. Court mandated that "the magistrate must be 
informed of some of the underlying circumstances from which the 
informant [could conclude] that the narcotics were where he claimed 
they were, and some of the underlying circumstances from which the 
officer [could conclude] that the informant ...was 'credible' or his 
information 'reliable.' "136 The prosecution satisfied the basis-of­
knowledge prong in Palanza by informing the magistrate, through 
the personal observation of an experienCed informant, of ''the under­
lying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the 
narcotics were where he claimed they were."137 Direct personal ob­
servation by an informer of criminal activity satisfies the basis-of­
knowledge prong,138 and is sufficient to establish the reliability of the 
evidence upon which the informant based his conclusions of wrong­
doing. 139 Furthermore, this direct personal observation was con­
firmed by an occupant of the premises. Therefore, the affid~vit 
clearly satisfied the basis-of-knowledge prong, and the court; in 
Palanza, should have so held, rather than engage in an unwarranted 
refuiement of the knowledge test. l40 
136. Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 114 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). 
137. Id.; see 55 Ill. App. 3d at 1029-30,371 N.E.2d at 688. 
138. See Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 416. 
139. United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 589 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("al­
leged direct personal observation of the informant [is] surely a sufficient basis upon 
which to predicate a finding of reliability [of evidence] under any test"). 
140. See United States v. Cates, 663 F.2d 947,948 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. 
House, 604 F.2d 1135, 1142 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 931 (1980); United 
States v. Shipstead, 433 F.2d 368, 372 (9th Cir. 1970). 
As an example, among several others, of how an affiant may properly demonstrate 
the basis of knowledge of his informant, the Palanza court quoted, with approval, one 
commentator's observation that the informer "may be shown to know that the substance 
was a narcotic substance by. . . 'a use of a part of the substance by the informant fol­
lowed by the effects to be expected if it is what the informant says it is.''' 55 Ill. App. 3d 
at 1030-31, 371 N.E.2d at 689 (quoting LaFave, Probable Cause frdm Informants: The 
Effects ofMurphy's Law on Fourth Amendment Adjudication, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 1,39-40). 
Such an unrealistic approach undoubtedly contributed to the demise of Aguilar­
Spinelli in Gates. See Shipstead, 433 F.2d at 372 ("[t]he suggestion that a search warrant 
affidavit must allege how the informant knew the drug was methamphetamine is hyper­
critical and falls before the [United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965)] admo­
nitions. . .that such affidavits 'must be tested. . .in a common sense and realistic 
fashion' and '[t]echnical requirements of elaborate specificity ...have no proper place in 
this area' "); accord, Cates, 663 F.2d at 948 (informant related personally observed facts; 
"[i]t is not critical that he did not state how he lQlew that the contraband was a controlled 
substance") (citations omitted); House, 604 F.2d at 1142 (an omission in the affidavit as 
to how the informer identified the drugs is not "fatal" to a finding of probable cause). 
353 1983] PROBABLE CAUSE AFTER GATES 
The third, and final, case cited by the Gates majority to illus­
trate the "rigid application" of the Aguilar-Spinelli rules was People 
v. Brethauer.141 !nBrethauer, the Supreme Court of Colorado inval­
idated a warrant that had been issued on the basis of an affidavit 
This unrealistic approach ignored the fact that the standard of probable cause is " 'only 
the probability, and not a prima facie showing,''' Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2330 (quoting 
Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 419); see Locke, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 348, or "proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the evidence," Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2330, of 
criminal activity. 
Although it is true that the basis-of-knowledge prong of Aguilar-Spinelli may be 
satisfied by an informant injecting himself with a part of the alleged narcotic substance, 
followed by the effects to be expected from the injection of narcotics, Foxall v. State, 157 
Ind. App. 19,24-25,298 N.E.2d 470, 472-73 (1973), it does not follow that this method of 
proof sets "a minimum standard" by which all methods of satisfying the knowledge test 
are 'to be measured. Hoskins v. State, 174 Ind. App. 475, 479, 367 N.E.2d 1388, 1390 
(1977) (observing that were the rule otherwise, the affidavit in Foxall would itself have 
. been deficient "because the informant did not state how he knew what a heroin reaction 
was like"). Nor is it appropriate to argue, as one commentator has, that insistence upon 
some showing that the informant knew that the substance he observed was, in fact, a 
narcotic, is not hypercritical because such a showing of knowledge may be made in a 
variety of ways. LaFave, supra note 115, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. at 39. The ease with which 
the basis-of-knowledge requirement may be satisfied by a particular method in a particu­
lar factual setting is not the issue. Rather, the issue is whether the standard of probable 
cause has been satisfied by the particular method employed in that particular setting. 
Resolution of this issue will depend upon the surrounding facts and circumstances. 
Here, both magistrates and reviewing courts should be guided by the Supreme Court's 
admonition in Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949): 
In dealing with probable cause, however, as the very name implies, we deal 
with probabilities. These are not technical; they are the factual and practical 
considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal 
technicians, act. The standard of proof is accordingly correlative to what must 
be proved. 
Id. at 175 (emphasis added). 
The Court has remained faithful to this command by insisting that affidavits for 
warrants "must be tested and interpreted by magistrates and courts in a commonsense 
and realistic fashion." United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965); see Gates, 
103 S. Ct. at 2330-31, 2332. Such documents are "normally drafted by nonlawyers in the 
midst and haste of a criminal investigation," and "[t]echnical requirements of elaborate 
specificity" would have "no proper place in this area." Ventresca, 380 U.S. at 108; see 
Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2330. Furthermore, a "grudging or negative attitude by reviewing 
courts toward warrants will tend to discourage [law enforcement officers] from submit­
ting their evidence to a judicial officer before acting," Ventresca, 380 U.S. at 108, which is 
what the Supreme Court has encouraged them to do. See United States v. Watson, 423 
U.S. 411, 423 (1976); Ventresca, 380 U.S. at 106-09; see also Jones v. United States, 362 
U.S. 257, 270-71 (1960). The short of it is, that if the police are to be encouraged to seek 
warrants, they should not simultaneously be discouraged from doing so by rigid insis­
tence upon hypertechnical assesments of probable cause. See Ventresca, 380 U.S. at 108­
09; Gonzales v. Beto, 425 F.2d 963, 970 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 928 (1970). 
Similarly, they should not be restricted to any particular method, regardless of its degree 
of reliability, of establishing the basis of knowledge of an informant's tip. 
141. 174 Colo. 29, 482 P.2d 369 (1971) (en banc). 
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containing an informant's tip. The affiant stated that he knew the 
informant "'to be reliable, based on past information supplied by 
the informer which has proved to be accurate.' "142 The informer 
claimed that L.S.D. and marijuana were located on specified prem­
ises, as well as in two motor vehicles, and the affiant alleged that the 
informant had purchased, on two occasions, L.S.D. and S.T.P. 
"'within the past five days.' "143 The affiant also stated that the 
purchased capsules were delivered to the" 'Weld County Sheriffs 
Office, [and] were tested and did contain L.S.D. and S.T.P.' "144 
Further, that at the time of purchase, the informer saw other cap­
sules containing L.S.D. and S.T.P., " 'and the party making the sale 
said he had two ounces of marijuana.' "145 The seller also told the 
informant that he was going to obtain one hundred additional cap­
sules of L.S.D. and two kilograms of marijuana, " 'and offered to sell 
to the informer one kilogram of marijuana.' "146 Finally, the in­
formant, who " 'also saw instruments for use in smoking marijuana 
on the premises, [is] to make the purchase today.' "147 
The court found the affidavit to be "fatally defective" under 
both prongs of Aguilar-Spinel/i, as the reliability of the informant 
was never established, nor was any basis set forth to show the source 
of his information. 148 Furthermore, the court reasoned, while the 
affidavit referred to three locations, namely, two motor vehicles and 
a house, there was nothing in the affidavit which indicated how the 
informer had concluded that the drugs were present in the house, or 
that there existed a connection between the defendants and the 
house or the vehicles. 149 In addition, the affidavit did not show 
whether the information obtained by the informant was through his 
own observations or from another person. Nor did the affidavit con­
tain a statement "as to whether" the "alleged" purchases had taken 
place on the premises or had involved persons who were "in any 
way" related to or associated with the premises. 150 Finally, the 
court concluded, nothing appeared in the affidavit to establish 
whether the capsules and marijuana had been observed by the in­
former or by someone else, or to establish where the" 'instruments' " 







149. Id. at 34-35, 482 P.2d at 371. 
150. Id. at 35, 482 P.2d at 371. 
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had been observed.l5l 
Justice Hodges, dissenting, correctly complained that the major­
ity was requiring "supertechnical drafting of affidavits," and had 
failed to perceive from the affidavit the connection between "the de­
scribed [drug] transactions [and] the described premises." 152 But, ar­
gued Justice Hodges, "the affidavit describes that the informant 
[had] stated that there [were] L.S.D. and S.T.P. capsules and mari­
juana at the premises; that the informant [had] made purchases of 
the same; and [that] the informant also saw instruments for use in 
smoking marijuana on the premises." 153 Moreover, the first sentence 
of the affidavit specifically stated the address of the premises. Thus, 
he interpreted the majority opinion as apparently requiring every 
clause of the affidavit to be followed by a specific reference to the 
address of the premises. 154 
Decisions such as Brethauer, Palanza, and Bridger place law en­
forcement officers between a rock and a hard place. On the one 
hand, the Supreme Court has admonished them to seek warrants 
wherever reasonably feasible. 155 Accordingly, to encourage the 
practice of seeking warrants, the Court has expressed a preference 
for searches and seizures conducted under the authority of a warrant 
by noting that, in doubtful or marginal cases, a search or seizure 
under a warrant may be sustained where, without one, it would be 
invalidated. 156 On the other hand, if affidavits for search warrants 
are not tested and interpreted by magistrates and courts "in a com­
monsense and realistic fashion," but rather, are subjected to 
"[t]echnical requirements of elaborate specificity," as reflected in a 
"grudging or negative attitude by reviewing courts toward war­
rants," police officers will be reluctant to submit this evidence of 
wrongdoing to prior judicial scrutiny. 157 This is precisely the vice of 
151. Id. 
152. Id. at 42, 482 P.2d at 375 (Hodges, J., dissenting). 
153. Id. 
154. Id. 
155. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (subject only to "a few" excep­
tions, warrantless searches are per se unreasonable); United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 
102, 106-09 (1965) (strongly supporting preference to be accorded to searches under a 
warrant). 
156. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 423 (1976) (arrest warrant); Ven­
tresca, 380 U.S. at 106-09 (search warrant); see also Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 
270-71 (1960) (in doubtful cases, where there is lacking "clearly convincing evidence" 
justifying immediate need to search, it is "most important that resort be had to a war­
rant," so that determinations of probable cause can be made by "an independent judicial 
officer"). 
157. Ventresca, 380 U.S. at 108; United States v. Shipstead, 433 F.2d 368, 372 (9th 
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the decisions in Brethauer, Palanza, and Bridger. By subjecting the 
basis-of-knowledge prong of Aguilar-Spinelli to a hypercritical as­
sessment of probable cause, the courts in these cases effectively dis­
couraged the police from submitting their evidence to a judicial 
officer prior to acting. 
Constitutional rules and principles were established to guaran­
tee fundamental rights, not to encourage the facilitation of crime. 
The net result of applying theAgui/ar-Spinelli rules in an excessively 
technical and unrealistic fashion has been to breed disrespect for the 
lofty ideals the Supreme Court sought to implement by fashioning 
the rules, and to thwart the Court's attempts to encourage the police 
to submit their evidence of crime to prior judicial scrutiny. 
And so, the stage was set for Gates. 
IV. ILLINOIS V. GATES 
In Illinois v. Gates,158 the Supreme Court "squarely addressed," 
for the first time, the application of the Aguilar-Spinelli standards to 
tips from anonymous informants. 159 At issue was the constitutional 
sufficiency of an anonymous, but partially corroborated, message re­
ceived by the police. 160 
Bloomingdale, Illinois, is a suburb of Chicago, and is located in 
Du Page County. On May 3, 1978, the Bloomingdale Police Depart­
ment received by mail an anonymous handwritten letter which 
stated that the defendants, Lance and Susan Gates, were residents of 
" 'your town [who] strictly make their living on selling drugs.' "161 
The tip further alleged that the defendants lived" 'on Greenway, off 
Bloomingdale Rd. in the condominiums.' "162 
Cir. 1970) Brethauer, 174 Colo. at 42-43, 482 P.2d at 375 (Hodges, J., dissenting); see 
Gonzales v. Beto, 425 F.2d 963, 970 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 928 (1970). 
158. 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983). 
159. /d. at 2356 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
160. The specific question presented for review was whether "detailed information 
provide to police by an anonymous informer, coupled with government corroboration of 
the information, provide probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant?" Peti­
tioner's Opening Brief on Merits at i, Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983). 
After receiving briefs and hearing oral arguments on this issue, the Court ordered 
the parties in Gates to address the question of whether the exclusionary rule should be 
modified to permit the admissibility of evidence obtained by law enforcement officers in 
the reasonable belief that their search-and-seizure conduct was consistent with the fourth 
amendment. The Court, however, "with apologies to all," declined to address this good­
faith exception to the exclusionary rule, on the ground that it was never raised before, 
nor passed upon by, the Illinois courts. G(Jt~, 103 S. Ct. at 2321. 
161. Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2325. 
162. Id. 
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The message went on to relate that the defendants made most of 
their drug purchases in Florida, with Susan Gates driving the family 
car to Florida and leaving it there to be " 'loaded up' " with drugs. 163 
Lance Gates would then fly down to Florida and drive the vehicle 
back home. Meanwhile, Susan Gates would fly back to Illinois, after 
having dropped the car off in Florida. l64 
In addition, the tip predicted that Susan would be driving down 
to Florida on " 'May 3,' " and that Lance would be " 'flying down in 
a few days to drive it back.' "165 The tip then alleged that when 
Lance "'drives the car back[,] he has the trunk loaded with over 
$100,000.00 in drugs.''' Further, stated the message, the Gates' pres­
ently" 'have over $100,000.00 worth of drugs in their basement.' "166 
The report imparted. the fact that the Gates' bragged that they . 
never had to work, making their "'entire living on pushers,' " and 
concluded with the" 'guarantee [that] if you watch them carefully 
you will make a big catch. They are friends with some big drug 
dealers, who visit their home often.' "167 
The letter was referred to Detective Mader, who decided to pur­
sue the tip. Mader's investigation revealed that Lance Gates had an 
Illinois driver's license, and was residing with his wife in Blooming­
dale. Ije also learned from a police officer assigned to O'Hare Air­
port that one "L. Gates" had made a reservation on Eastern Airlines 
flight 245 to West Palm Beach, Florida, scheduled to depart from 
Chicago on May 5th at 4:15 p.m. 168 
Mader then made arrangements with an agent of the Drug En­
forcement Administration (DEA) to place the May 5th Eastern Air­
lines flight under surveillance. The Agent later reported to Mader 
that Gates had boarded the flight, and that federal agents in Florida 
had observed him arrive in West Palm Beach and take a taxicab to a 
nearby Holiday Inn. The agents further reported that Gates went to 
a room registered to a Susan Gates, and that, at 7:00 a.m. the next 
day, Gates and an unidentified woman left the hotel in a Mercury 
automobile bearing Illinois registration plates and drove northbound 
on an interstate highway frequently used by travelers driving the 
Chicago area. In addition, the DEA agent advised Mader that the 
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station wagon owned by Gates. The agent also informed Mader that 
the driving time between West Palm Beach and Bloomingdale was 
approximately twenty to twenty-four hours.169 
Mader then executed an affidavit setting forth the foregoing. 
facts, and submitted it to an Illinois magistrate, along with a copy of 
the anonymous letter. The magistrate, making a finding of probable 
cause on the basis of the tip, as corroborated by the law enforcement. 
investigation, issued a search warrant for the Gates' residence and 
for their motor vehicle pO 
On May 7th, at 5:15 a.m., approximately thirty-six hours after 
he had departed from Chicago by air, Lance Gates, along with his 
wife Susan, returned to his residence in Bloomingdale, driving the 
motor vehicle in which they had left West Palm Beach some twenty­
two hours earlier. The Bloomingdale police were waiting for them, 
and conducted a search of the trunk of the Mercury which uncov­
ered a large quantity of marijuana. A search of the defendants' 
home revealed additional marijuana, as well as weapons and other 
contraband.171 
The defendants successfully moved to suppress the fruits of 
these searches, persuading the Illinois courts that the warrant had 
been issued without probable cause.172 A majority of the Supreme 
Court of Illinois observed that, standing alone, the anonymous tip 
could not provide the basis for a magistrate's detemination of the 
existence of probable cause. 173 The majority found that the letter to 
the Bloomingdale Police Department was deficient in establishing 
that its author was credible or his information reliable, and in pro­
viding an adequate basis for the writer's predictions regarding the 
criminal activities of the defendants. Thus, the tip failed to satisfy 
either the veracity or the basis-of-knowledge prong of the Aguilar 
test}74 
The majority opinion next analyzed Detective Mader's affidavit 
to determine whether it might be capable of supplementing the tip 
with information sufficient to permit a finding of probable cause. 
Again, however, it concluded that there was lacking sufficient infor­
mation, even as supplemented by the affidavit, to sustain a detemina­
169. Id. at 2325-26. 
170. See id. at 2326. 
171. Id. 
172. People v. Gates, 85 Ill. 2d 376, 390, 423 N.E.2d 887, 893 (1981). 
173. Id. at 386, 423 N.E.2d at 891. 
174. Id. at 384-86, 423 N.E.2d at 890-91. The Supreme Court of the United States 
was "inclined to agree" with this assessment. 103 S. Ct. at 2326. 
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tion of probable cause. 17S First, the majority opinion found that the 
Aguilar-Spinelli veracity prong had not been satisfied because there 
was no legitimate basis for a determination by either the magistrate 
or Detective Mader that the anonymous informant was credible. 176 
It rejected the notion that self-verifying detail in an informer's report 
may be resorted to to establish the credibility of an informant or the 
reliability of his information, thereby satisfying the veracity prong of 
Aguilar-Spinelli. To the court, a fabricated story could just as easily 
be based upon fine detail as it could be upon a rough outline. 
Hence, minute detail did not inform the court about veracity}77 
In addition, the Supreme Court of Illinois determined that the 
letter from the anonymous informer gave no indication to the re­
viewing magistrate of the basis of its writer's knowledge of the de­
fendants' criminal activities. 178 Not only had the report failed to 
supply sufficient detail to permit an inference that the informant had 
a reliable basis for his allegations, but also the corroborative evi­
dence contained in Detective Mader's affidavit was only of innocent 
activity.179 Therefore, because the anonymous tip had failed to sat­
isfy both prongs of the Aguilar-Spinelli inqUiry,180 and the corrobo­
rative evidence contained in the supporting affidavit was insufficient 
to cure the deficiency in either prong, there was an absence of prob­
able cause for the warrant. 181 
After comparing the specific detail of the tip and the corroborat­
ing information in the Gates affidavit with the situation presented in 
Draper v. United States, 182 Justice Moran was persuaded that the 
Draper analysis was dispositive of the issue raised. In his dissent in 
Gates, he argued that the specificity of detail in the letter, coupled 
with the corroboration of every detail of the informant's report by 
the police investigation, was sufficient to satisfy the underlying basis­
of-knowledge prong ofAguilar-Spinelli}83 Furthermore, the specific 
information contained in the tip, subsequently verified by the law 
enforcement officers, demonstrated the credibility and reliability of 
the informer's allegations, thereby satisfying the veracity prong of 
175. 85 Ill. 2d at 386-87, 423 N.E.2d at 891-92. 
176. Id. at 385, 423 N.E.2d at 891. 
177. Id. at 388, 423 N.E.2d at 892. The court did observe that self-verifying detail 
may be used to satisfy the basis-or-knowledge test. Id. 
178. Id. at 389, 423 N.E.2d at 893. 
179. Id. at 389-90, 423 N.E.2d at 893. 
180. See iii. at 384, 423 N.E.2d at 891; see also Gales, 103 S. Ct. at 2326-27. 
181. See 85 Ill.2d at 389-90, 423 N.E.2d at 893. 
182. 358 U.S. 307 (1959); see infra text accompanying notes 220-28. 
183. 85 Ill. 2d at 393-94, 423 N.E.2d at 895 (Moran, J., dissenting). 
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Aguilar-Spinelli}84 Although Justice Moran acknowledged that the 
corroborating information related to innocent activity, it was, in this 
case, "endowed with an aura of suspicion by virtue of the inform­
ant's tip." 185 
To Justice Moran, then, the "determining factor" in complying 
with both prongs ofAguilar-Spinelli and establishing probable cause 
is "the specificity of the tip combined with the police verification by 
investigation."186 Because that had been accomplished in this case, 
and the issuance of the warrant in question was consistent with the 
rationale underlyingAguilar-Spinelli, the defendants' right to be free 
from unreasonable searches and seizures was not violated. 187 
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed. In so doing, the Court 
repudiated the two-prong analysis developed and refined in Aguilar­
Spinelli, and replaced it with a totality-of-the-circumstances ap­
proach in which the elements of an informant's "veracity," "reliabil­
ity," and "basis of knowledge" would not be treated as "entirely 
separate and independent requirements to be rigidly exacted in every 
case." 188 Although the Court considered these elements as being 
"highly relevant" in assessing the value of an informant's tip, it nev­
ertheless believed that they should be examined as "closely inter­
twined issues that may usefully illuminate the commonsense, 
practical question whether there is 'probable cause' " for the issuance 
of a warrant. 189 
Writing for a five-member majority, Justice Rehnqu"ist opined 
that probable cause was too "fluid" a concept - "turning on the 
assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts" - to lend 
itself to "a neat set" of legal commands. 190 Compounding this lack 
of fixity is the variability of informants' tips,191 which "doubtless 
come in many shapes and sizes from many different types of per­
sons."192 It was readily apparent, therefore, to the majority, that 
"[r]igid legal rules are ill-suited to an area of such diversity."193 
184. Id. at 394, 423 N.E.2d at 895. 
185. Id. at 395, 423 N.E.2d at 896. 
186. Id. at 395, 423 N.E.2d at 895. 
187. Id. at 396, 423 N.E.2d at 896. 
188. 103 S. Ct. at 2327-28 (footnote omitted). 
189. Id. at 2328. 
190. Id. In Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), the Court had ob­
served that the "quantum of information which constitutes probable cause. . must be 
measured by the/acts of the particular case." Id. at 479 (emphasis added). 
191. 103 S. Ct. at 2329. 
192. Id. at 2328. 
193. Id. at 2329. 
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Moreover, continued Justice Rehnquist, there are "persuasive 
arguments" against according the elements of an informant's verac­
ity or reliability and his basis of knowledge the independent status 
required by theAguilar-Spinelli analysis. Instead, these elements are 
"better understood" as relevant considerations in the totality-of-the­
circumstances approach that should guide determinations of prob­
able cause. Thus, under this approach, a deficiency in one element 
may be compensated, in assessing the overall reliability of an in­
former's report or tip, by a strong showing as to the other,. "or by 
some other indicia of reliability."194 
Justice Rehnquist cited the following as illustrative examples of 
the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis: 
(a) if an informant is known for the "unusual reliability of his 
predictions of certain types of criminal activities in a locality, 
his failure, in a particular case, to thoroughly set forth the basis 
of his knowledge surely should not serve as an absolute bar to a 
finding of probable cause based on ,his tip"; . 
(b) if a report of criminal activity is received from an "unques­
tionably honest citizen. . .-which if fabricated would subject 
him to criminalliability-" it will not be necessary to subject 
the basis of his knowledge to "rigorous scrutiny"; and 
(c) even if some doubt is entertained as to a particular inform­
ant's motives, his "explicit and detailed description of alleged 
wrongdoing, along with a statement that the event was observed 
first-hand, entitles his tip to greater weight than might otherwise 
be the case."19S 
These examples, then, demonstrate the "balanced assesment of 
the relative weights of all the various indicia of reliability (and unre­
liability) attending an informant's tip" 196 sanctioned under the total­
ity-of-the-circumstances approach. In contrast, reasoned Justice 
Rehnquist, the Aguilar-Spinelli two-pronged test has "encouraged an 
excessively technical dissection of informants tips, with undue atten­
tion being focused on isolated issues that cannot sensibly be divorced 
from the other facts presented to [a reviewing] magistrate."197 
194. Id. This analysis is a variation of the standard of reasonableness, determined 
by "the facts and circumstances - the total atmosphere of the case," adopted by the court 
in United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66 (1950). 
195. 103 S. Ct. at 2329-30. 
196. Id. at 2330. 
197. Id. As examples of such "dissection," reflecting a "rigid application" of the 
Aguilar-Spinelli rules, the majority cited People v. Brethauer, 174 Colo. 29,482 P.2d 369 
(1971) (en bane); People v. Palanza, 55 lli. App. 3d 1028, 371 N.E.2d 687 (1978); and 
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Because only the probability of criminal wrongdoing is the stan­
dard of probable cause,198 and the warrant process involves numer­
ous laymen applying "nontechnical, common-sense judgments," 
technical requirements of elaborate specificity, appropriate to more 
formal legal proceedings, are inappropriate to proceedings involving 
determinations of probable cause. 199 Moreover, the majority ob­
served, the inherent subtleties of the two-pronged test, compounded 
by the informal, "often hurried context" in which it must be applied, 
are "particularly unlikely to assist magistrates in determining prob­
able cause."200 
Similarly, Justice Rehnquist continued, reviewing courts should 
pay great deference to a magistrate's finding of probable cause, and 
should not subject the constitutional sufficiency of supporting affida­
vits for warrants to an "after-the-fact-scrutiny" that takes the form of 
a "de novo" review.201 For a court to engage in a "'grudging or neg­
ative attitude' " towards warrants, by interpreting supporting " 'affi­
davits in a hypertechnical, rather than a commonsense, manner,' " 
would run counter to the strong preference of the fourth amendment 
for searches conducted pursuant to a warrant.202 The net result 
might be an increased reliance by law enforcement officers on war­
rantless searches and seizures.203 
Reflecting this preference for the warrant process, Justice 
Rehnquist noted that the "traditional [in contrast with the Aguilor­
Spinelli] standard" for reviewing a magistrate's determination of 
probable cause has been that the fourth amendment requires only a 
substantial basis for a finding of probable cause.204 Accordingly, re­
affirmation of this standard will "better serve[]" the purpose of en­
couraging the police to seek recourse to the warrant procedure, and 
Bridger v. State, 503 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974). See supra text accompanying 
notes 120-57. 
198. Although probability is the acknowledged standard of probable cause, Gales, 
103 S. Ct. at 2330; Texas v. Brown, 103 S. Ct. 1535, 1543 (1983) (plurality opinion) (a 
"'practical, nontechnical' probability"); Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 419, Justice Rehnquist 
quoted, with approval, Chief Justice Marshall's observation in Locke that "the term 
'probable cause,' according to its usual acceptation, means less than evidence which 
would justify condemnation. . . .It importS a seizure made under circumstances which 
warrant suspicion." 103 S. Ct. at 2330 (citing Locke, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 348)(emphasis 
added). 
199. 103 S. Ct. at 2330-31. 
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is "more consistent" with a reviewing court's deference to determina­
tions of probable cause by magistrates than is the two-pronged test 
ofAguilar-Spinelli.205 
Of final relevance to the majority's repudiation of Aguilar­
Spinelli was the belief that the strictures which "inevitably accom­
pany" the two-pronged test cannot avoid "seriously impeding" the 
task of effective law enforcement.206 If that test must be "rigorously" 
applied in every case, anonymous tips will prove to be of "greatly 
diminished value in police work."207 In the opinion of the majority, 
it could not be expected of "[o]rdinary citizens [to provide] extensive 
recitations of the basis of their everyday observations."208 Likewise, 
noted the majority, the veracity of anonymous informants is "by hy­
pothesis largely unknown, and unknowable."209 Consequently, tips 
from such persons seldom could survive a "rigorous application" of 
either of the Aguilar-Spinelli prongs. Yet, such reports, particularly 
when supplemented by independent police investigation, will con­
tribute frequently to the solution of crimes. While a "conscientious 
assessment" of the basis for crediting anonymous tips is required by 
fourth amendment jurisprudence, a standard that leaves "virtually 
no place for anonymous citizen informants is not."210 
"For all these reasons," concluded the majority, it was ''wiser to 
abandon" the Aguilar-Spinelli two-pronged test, and, in its place, to 
"reaffirm" the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis that ''tradition­
ally" has informed determinations of probable cause.211 This will re­
quire a magistrate, passing upon an application for a warrant, 
simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given 
all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, includ­
ing the "veracity" and "basis of knowledge" of persons supplying 
hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or 
evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.212 
And, it will be the duty of a reviewing court "simply to ensure" that 
there was a substantial basis for the magistrate's conclusion that 





209. Id. at 2331-32. 
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"We are convinced," observed the majority, that this "flexible, 
easily applied standard" will "better achieve" the accomodation of 
private and public interests that the fourth amendment requires than 
does the Aguilar-Spinelli approach.214 
Although the Gates majority referred to its totality-of-the-cir­
cumstances analysis as a "standard," it never provided meaningful 
structure or guidelines for probable cause inquiries by magistrates 
reviewing applications for warrants, other than a general endorse­
ment of "a practical, common-sense" assessment of probable 
cause,215 and an admonition that" 'bare bones' affidavits" would not 
be sufficient to establish probable cause.216 Thus, once a magistrate 
determines that an affidavit contains more than "bare conclu­
sions,"217 he will have to decide, "based solely on 'practical[ity], and 
'common-sense,' whether there is a fair probability that contraband 
will be found in a particular place."218 This means, then, that the 
question of whether the probable cause standard is to be "diluted" in 
informant cases will be left solely to the commonsense judgements 
of magistrates, and "some showing of facts" that an informer is a 
credible person who has obtained his information in a reliable way 
would not be an express prerequisite to the issuance of a warrant.219 
Applying the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis to the affi­
davit in Gates, the majority had no difficulty in determining that the 
corroboration of details of the informant's tip by independent police 
work was sufficient to establish probable cause. Believing that the 
approach developed in J)raper v. United States, 220 the "classic case" 
on the importance and value of corroborative efforts of law enforce­
ment officials,221 represented controlling precedent, the Gates major­
ity briefly summarized the J)raper analysis. 
In J)raper, an informant named Hereford, who had previously 
provided accurate and reliable information, reported to law officers 
on September 3d that the defendant had recently taken up residence 
214. Id. 
215. Id. 
216. Id. at 2332-33. 
217. Id. at 2332. 
218. Id. at 2350 (White, J., concurring in the judgment) (brackets in original); see 
iii. at 2332-33 ("area" beyond the "'bare bones' affidavits" does not lend itself to "a 
prescribed set of rules," such as that developed from Spinelli; rather, ''the flexible, com­
mon-sense standard. . .better serves the purposes of the ... probable cause 
requirement"). 
219. See 103 S. Ct at 2350 (White, J., concurring in the judgment). 
220. 358 U.S. 307 (1959). 
221. 103 S. Ct. at 2334. 
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in Denver and "'was peddling narcotics to several addicts' in that 
city."222 Four days later, on September 7th, Hereford further re­
ported that the defendant had gone to Chicago the day before by 
train, and would be returning by train with three ounces of heroin, 
either on the morning of September 8th or the morning of the 9th.223 
Hereford also gave a detailed physical description of the defendant 
and of the clothing he would be wearing, describing Draper as a 
Negro of light brown complexion, 27 years of age, 5 feet, 8 inches in 
height, weighing approximately 160 pounds, and wearing a light 
colored coat, brown slacks, and black shoes. He also advised that 
Draper habitually" 'walked real fast.' "224 It does not appear, how­
ever, that Hereford provided any indication of the basis for his 
information. . 
Law officers took up suveillance at the Denver Union Station on 
the morning of September 8th, but did not see anyone fitting the 
description that Hereford had supplied. Repeating the process the 
following morning, the officers spotted a person, having "the exact 
physical attributes" and wearing the "precise clothing" described by 
the informant, alight from an incoming Chicago train and start 
walking" 'fast'" toward the exit.225 He was carrying a tan zipper 
bag in his right hand, and his left hand was thrust in the pocket of 
his raincoat. The officers intercepted the passenger, and placed him 
under arrest. An incidental search uncovered two envelopes contain­
ing heroin clutched in his left hand, and a syringe in the tan zipper 
bag.226 
In sustaining the legality of the warrantless arrest, the Supreme 
Court noted that in the process of investigating a tip from an in­
former of proven reliability, the officers, had "personally verified 
every facet of the information" imparted, except whether the defend­
ant had accomplished his mission and had the three ounces of heroin 
on his person or in his bag.227 The Court reasoned that "surely, with 
every other bit of Hereford's information being thus personally veri­
fied," the officers had probable cause to believe that "the remaining 
unverified bit of Hereford's information- that Draper would have 
the heroin with him- was likewise true. "228 
222. 358 U.S. at 309. 
223. Id. 
224. Id. at 309 & n.2. 
225. Id. at 309-10. 
226. Id. at 310. 
227. Id. at 313. 
228. Id. 
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Applying the Draper analysis to the showing of probable cause 
in Gates, the majority argued that the facts obtained through in­
dependent law enforcement investigation "at least suggested" that 
the defendants were involved in drug trafficking.229 The Court took 
note of the fact that Florida is ''well-known as a source" of illegal 
drugs.23o Furthermore, Lance Gates' flight to Palm Beach, his brief, 
overnight stay in a hotel, and "apparent immediate return north to 
Chicago in the family car, conveniently awaiting him in West Palm 
Beach," was as suggestive of a prearranged drug run as it was of an 
innocent vacation trip.231 
In addition, the Gates majority reasoned that the magistrate 
could rely upon the information contained in the anonymous letter, 
which had been corroborated "in major part" by the investigating 
officers.232 Although the informant in Draper had supplied reliable 
information on previous occasions, while the credibility and relia­
bility of the anonymous informant in Gates were unknown to the 
Bloomingdale police, this distinction, to the majority, became "far 
less significant" after the independent investigative work of Detec­
tive Mader had occured.233 "The corroboration of the letter's predic­
tions that the Gates' car would be in Florida, that Lance Gates 
would fiy to Florida in the next day or so, and that he would drive 
the [family] car north toward Bloomingdale all indicated, albeit not 
with certainty, that the informant's other assertions were also 
true."234 Because the informer had been proven accurate about some 
predictions, it was more likely that he was probably right about the 
other facts.235 Therefore, in the opinion of the majority, this type of 
229. 103 S. Ct. at 2334. 
230.· Id. 
231. Id. 
232. Id. at 2334-35. The fact that the verification of details contained in the letter 
amounted only to corroboration of seemingly innocent activity was of little moment to 
the majority. In the first place, the activity, while seemingly innocent, took on a suspi­
cious character in the light of the initial tip. Id. at 2335 n.l3. Secondly, the standard of 
probable cause is one only of "a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, 
not an actual showing of such activity." Id. From this the majority reasoned, "[b)y 
hypothesis, [that innocent behavior) frequently will provide the basis for a showing of 
probable cause." Id To require otherwise, thought the majority, would be to "sub silentio 
impose a drastically more rigorous definition of probable cause than the security of our 
citizens demands." Id Therefore, "the relevant inquiry," to the majority, in making a 
determination of probable cause, "is not whether particular conduct is 'innocent' or 
'guilty,' but the degree ofsuspicion that attaches to particular types of non-criminal acts." 
Id (emphasis added); see United States v. Anderson, 500 F.2d 1311, 1316 (5th Cir. 1974). 
233. 103 S. Ct. at 2335. 
234. Id 
235. Id; see Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 427 (White, J., concurring). 
367 1983] PROBABLE CAUSE AFTER GATES 
" 'reliability' " or " 'veracity,' " while not necessarily adequate to sat­
isfy "some views" of the veracity prong ofAguilar-Spinelli, was suffi­
cient for the "practical, common-sense judgement called for in 
making a probable cause determination."236 The majority was satis­
fied that, for purposes of assessing probable cause, it was enough 
that corroboration through other sources of information be sufficient 
to establish a substantial basis for crediting the tip.237 
Applying these criteria to the Gates tip, the majority found that 
"the anonymous letter contained a range of details relating not just 
to easily obtained facts and conditions existing at the time of the tip, 
but [also] to future actions of third parties ordinarily not easily pre­
dicted."238 Moreover, "[t]he letter writer's accurate information as to 
the travel plans of each of the Gates was of a character likely ob­
tained only from the Gates themselves, or from someone familiar 
with their not entirely ordinary travel plans."239 Thus, a magistrate 
could properly conclude that "[i]f the informant had access to accu­
rate information of this type. . .it was not unlikely that he also had 
access to reliable information of the Gates' alleged criminal activi­
ties."240 Although there was no certainty that the Gates' travel plans 
had not been "learned from a talkative neighbor or travel agent," it 
was enough, for purposes of probable cause analysis, that there ex­
isted a "fair probability that the writer of the anonymous letter had 
obtained his entire story either from the Gates or someone they 
trusted."24I "[J]ust this probability" was provided by corroboration 
of "major portions of the letter's predictions."242 The majority con­
cluded "that the judge issuing the warrant had a 'substantial basis 
for. . .conclud[ing)' that probable cause to search the Gates' home 
and car existed. "243 
236. 103 S. Ct. at 2335. 
237. ld; see Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 269, 271 (1960). 
238. 103 S. Ct. at 2335. 
239. ld 
240. ld 
241. ld at 2336. 
242. ld 
243. ld Justice Blackmun provided the fifth, and crucial, vote to overrule theAgui­
lar-Spinelli rules. His decision to join the majority was not surprising. In his concurring 
opinion in United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971), Justice Blackmun expressed his 
displeasure with Spinelli in strong terms. Not only did he believe that Spinelli had been 
"wrongly decided," at the Supreme Court level, but also that, if the decision were his to 
make, he "would overrule it." ld at 586 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Of further interest is 
the fact that Justice Blackmun had been a member of the majority of the Eighth Circuit 
who had upheld the legality of the Spinelli affidavit.ld at 585-86. Of such little ironies is 
legal history made. 
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Justice White concurred in the judgement in Gates, because he 
believed that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule gov­
erned the result in this case.244 However, Justice White's opinion 
amounted to a dissent on the issue of rejecting the Aguilar-Spinelli 
standards. While he agreed that the warrant was properly issued 
under the circumstances, he believed that this conclusion was consis­
tent with Aguilar-Spinelli.245 
To Justice White, the lower court's characterization of the 
Gates' activities as being innocent was "dubious."246 To the con­
trary, he viewed their behavior as being "quite suspicious."247 Lance 
Gates' flight to an area notorious for narcotic trafficking, the brief 
overnight stay in a hotel, and apparent immediate return trip north, 
suggested a pattern that has been recognized by trained law enforce­
ment officers as indicative of illegal drug-dealing activity.248 
But Justice White would have upheld the warrant even if only 
"completely innocuous activities" had been corroborated.249 To him, 
the "critical issue" was not whether the activities observed by the 
investigating law officers were "innocent or suspicious."25o Rather, 
the issue was whether it could be inferred from the actions of the 
suspects, that the informant is "credible" and that he has obtained 
his information "in a reliable manner."251 Moreover, this corrobora­
tion, based upon independent police work, could satisfy both the ve­
racity and basis-of-knowledge prongs of the Aguilar-Spinelli test.252 
Justice White believed that the police investigation in Gates 
"satisfactorily demonstrated," as it had in Draper v. United States,253 
that the informer's tip was as trustworthy as one that would alone 
have satisfied the Aguilar-Spinelli rules.254 The police had corrobo­
rated the defendant's travel plans, as detailed in the anonymous let­
ter. From this, Justice White argued, the reviewing magistrate "could 
244. 103 S. Ct. at 2336 (White, J., concurring in the judgment). 
245. Id at 2347. 
246. Id at 2348. 
247. Id 
248. Id at 2348; see United States v. Smith, 598 F.2d 936, 938 (5th Cir. 1979). 
249. 103 S. Ct. at 2348 (White, J., concurring in the judgment). 
250. Id 
251. Id; see United States v. Anderson, 500 F.2d at 1316. 
252. 103 S. Ct. at 2349 n.22. Justice White disagreed with Justice Brennan, who, in 
his dissenting Gales opinion, appeared to suggest that "the basis of knowledge prong 
could be satisfied by detail in the tip alone, but not by independant police work." Id; see 
id at 2354-55 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice White believed that the "rules would 
indeed be strange" if this were the case. Id at 2349 n.22. 
253. 358 U.S. 307 (1959). 
254. 103 S. Ct. at 2349 (White, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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reasonably have inferred" that the informant, who had "specific 
knowledge" of the defendants' "unusual" itinerary, had not 
fabricated his story, and that his information had been obtained in a 
reliable way.255 This, observed Justice White, was sufficient to sat­
isfy the Aguilar-Spinelli standard of probability of criminal activ­
ity.256 He therefore concluded that the judgement of the Supreme 
Court of Illinois, invalidating the warrant, had to be reversed.257 
Because Justice White reached his conclusion within the frame­
work ofAguilar-Spinelli, he did not believe it was necessary to over­
rule Aguilar-Spinelli in order to arrive at the correct result in 
Gates .258 Justice White believed that, when properly applied, the 
Aguilar-Spinelli rules play "an appropriate role" in determinations 
of probable cause. He was concerned, moreover, that the position 
adopted by the majority "may foretell an evisceration of the prob­
able cause standard."259 
Justice White took strong exception to the majority's attempt to 
integrate the veracity and basis-of-knowledge tests, so that a defi­
ciency in one could be compensated by a strong showing in the 
other.260 He was particularly uncomfortable with the prospect of a 
finding of probable cause based solely on a tip from an informant of 
previously demonstrated reliability or "an unquestionably honest 
citizen," when the report "thoroughly" fails to establish the basis 
upon which the information had been obtained.261 If this is so, rea­
soped Justice White, "then it must follow a fortiori" that a purely 
conclusory affidavit from a law enforcement officer, known by the 
magistrate to be honest and experienced, must also be acceptable. It 
would be "quixotic," indeed, if such a statement from an honest in­
former, but not from an honest law officer, could furnish probable 
cause.262 The Supreme Court, however, has recognized that mere 
conclusory assertions or beliefs of law officers do not satisfy the 
probable cause requirement,263 and Justice White feared that tpe 
majority's holding could be interpreted as "implicitly rej~cting" 
255. Id. 
256. Id. 
257. Id. at 2349-50. 





263. Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560,564-65 (1971); Ventresca, 380 U.S. at 108­
09 (dictum); Nathanson, 290 U.S. at 47. 
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those prior teachings.264 
Justice White acknowledged that the majority may not have in­
tended "so drastic a result," and noted that the Gates Court had ex­
pressly reaffirmed the validity of cases, such as Nathanson v. United 
States ,265 that have held that, no matter how reliable an affiant-of­
ficer may be, a warrant may not issue unless the affidavit discloses a 
supporting factual basis.266 He interpreted the majority position as 
limiting these cases to situations involving affidavits containing only 
"bare conclusions" and holding that, if an affidavit contains "any­
thing more," it should be left to the reviewing magistrate to decide, 
"based solely on 'practical[ity), and 'common-sense,''' whether there 
is "a fair probability" that objects subject to seizure will be found in 
a particular place.267 
Thus, it appeared to Justice White, from his reading of the ma­
jority opinion, that the question of whether the probable cause stan­
dard is "to be diluted" was to be entrusted to "the common-sense 
judgments of issuing magistrates."268 He was "reluctant," however, 
to approve any standard that did not "expressly" require, as a pre­
requisite to the issuance of a warrant in cases involving tips from 
informants, "some showing of facts from which an inference may be 
drawn" that the informer is a credible person whose information has 
been obtained in a reliable way.269 
In conclusion, while Justice White agreed that the Court was 
"correctly concerned with the fact that some lower courts ha[d] been 
applying AgUilar-Spinelli in an unduly rigid manner," he still be­
lieved that, "with clarification of the rule of corroborating informa­
tion, the lower courts are fully able to properly interpret Aguilar­
Spinelli and avoid such unduly-rigid applications."27o "I may be 
wrong," Justice White was frank to acknowledge, and "it ultimately 
may prove to be the case that the only profitable instruction we can 
provide to magistrates is to rely on common sense."271 Still, "the 
question [of] whether a particular anonymous tip provides the basis 
for [the] issuance of a warrant will often be a difficult one," and Jus­
tice White would "at least attempt to provide more adequate gui­
264. 103 S. Ct. at 2350 (White, J., concurring in the judgment). 
265. 290 U.S. 41 (1933). 




270. Id at 2350-51. 
271. Id at 2351. 
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dance by clarifying Aguilar-Spinelli and the relationship of those 
cases with Draper before totally abdicating our responsibility in this 
area."272 "Hence," he could not join the majority opinion, "rejecting 
the Aguilar-Spinelli rules."273 
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Brennan, dissented, because 
Detective Mader's affidavit failed to satisfy even the new relaxed 
standard announced by the majority.274 First, the dissent argued 
that the informant's accuracy had been compromised by the discrep­
ancy between his allegation that Susan Gates would drive the family 
car to Florida, where she would leave it to be loaded up with drugs, 
and then fly back home, and the fact that Detective Mader's affidavit 
reported that she "left the West Palm Beach area driving the Mer­
cury northbound."275 To Justice Stevens, this "material mistake" 
undermined the reasonableness of relying upon the tip as a basis for 
making a forcible entry into a private residence.276 Moreover, it 
"cast doubt" on the informer's hypothesis that the defendants had 
"'over $100,000 worth of drugs in their basement.' "277 The inform­
ant's prediction, of an itinerary that always kept one defendant in 
Bloomingdale, suggested that the defendants were reluctant to leave 
their home unguarded because they had something valuable hidden 
there. That inference, reasoned Justice Stevens, "obviously" could 
not be drawn once it became known that the defendants were "actu­
ally together over a thousand miles from home."278 Finally, Justice 
Stevens believed that the discrepancy made the Gates' conduct ap­
pear "substantially less unusual" than the informer had described it. 
In short, he could find nothing "unusual" or "probative of criminal 
activity" in the "mere facts" that Mrs. Gates was in West Palm 
Beach with the family car, that she was subsequently joined by her 
husband at the Holiday Inn, and that the couple drove north to­
gether the following morning. 279 
Accordingly, Justice Stevens could not accept the majority's 
"casual conclusion" that, prior to the arrival of the defendants in 
272. Id (emphasis added). 
273. Id 
274. Id at 2360 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
275. Id Justice Rehnquist, in his majority opinion, dismissed this complaint, not­
ing that the Court has never required that "informants used by the police be infallible," 
and that probable cause, particularly when law enforcement oficers have obtained a war­
rant, does "not require the perfection the dissent finds necessary." Id at 2335 n.14. 
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Bloomingdale, there was probable cause to justify a valid entry and 
search of their home.28o He noted that no one knew who the inform­
ant in this case was, or what had motivated him to write the letter. 
Furthermore, given that the report's predictions were "faulty in one 
significant respect," and were corroborated by nothing more than 
"ordinary innocent activity," Justice Stevens could only "surmise" 
that the majority's evaluation of the warrant's validity had been 
"color~d by subsequent events."281 
Justice Stevens also rejected the majority's attempt to find sup­
port for its holding in the .Draper analysis.282 He observed that 
.Draper was readily distinguishable because that case involved the 
proven reliability of a known informant. Here, by contrast, the po­
lice were dealing with an anonymous informer, and some of his in­
formation was neither accurate nor reliable.283 
Justice Stevens concluded that, "[i]n a fact-bound inquiry of this 
sort, the judgment of three levels of state courts, all of whom are 
better able to evaluate the probable reliability of anonymous infor­
mants in Bloomingdale, Illinois, than we are, should be entitled to at 
least a presumption of accuracy."284 Although the veracity and basis­
of-knowledge factors were now to be considered together, under the 
majority's analysis, "as circumstanceS whose totality must be ap­
praised," the lower courts had found "neither factor present."285 In 
addition, the "supposed 'other indicia' " took the form of activity 
that was not "particularly remarkable."286 Therefore, Justice Stevens 
could "not understand how the Court [could] find that the 'totality' 
so far exceeds the sum of its 'circumstances.' "287 
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, authored the prin­
cipal dissent in Gates. He characterized the majority's rejection of 
the Aguilar-Spinelli two-pronged test as a method for evaluating the 
280. Id. at 2361. 
281. Id. (footnote omitted). 
282. Id. at 2361 n. 7. 
283. Id. 
284. Id. at 2361-62 (footnote omitted). 
285. Id. at 2362 n. 8. 
286. Id. 
287. Id. Justice Stevens would have vacated the judgment of the Supreme Court of 
Illinois and remanded the case for reconsideration on the issue of the validity of a war­
rantless search of the defendants' automobile in the light of the intervening decision in 
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982). Under Ross, the search of the Gates' automo­
bile may have been valid if the officers had probable cause, after the defendants had 
arrived back in Bloomingdale, to believe that the vehicle contained contraband. 103 S. 
Ct. at 2361, 2362 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see Ross, 456 U.S. at 800, 806-09, 817-21, 823­
25. 
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validity of a warrant based on hearsay as "unjustified and ill-ad­
vised."288 In similar vein, he chastised the majority for overstating 
its case that Aguilar-Spinelli had seriously impeded effective lawen­
forcement and rendered anonymous tips "valueless in police 
work."289 
As Justice Brennan viewed the situation, the way in which the 
Aguilar-Spinelli standards had been repudiated had to be a matter 
"of particular concern to all Americans," because such a repudiation 
had given ''virtually no consideration to the value of insuring that 
findings of probable cause are based on information that a magis­
trate can reasonably say has been obtained in a reliable way by an 
honest or credible person."290 Thus, he shared Justice White's fear 
that the repudiation ofAguilar-Spinelli in favor of the totality-of-the­
circumstances test" 'may foretell an evisceration of the probable 
cause standard ... .' "291 
To Justice Brennan, the majority's "complete failure to provide 
any persuasive reason for rejecting Aguilar and Spinelli doubtlessly 
reflects impatience with what it perceives to be 'overly technical' 
rules governing searches and seizures under the [fjourth 
[a]mendment."292 Hence, he interpreted words such as "'practical,' 
'nontechnical,' and 'commonsense,' as used in the Court's opinion, 
[as] but code words for an overly permissive attitude towards [law 
enforcement] practices in derogation of the rights secured by the 
[flourth [a]mendment."293 
Neither was he impressed with "the Court's concern over the 
horrors of drug trafficking," as apparent justification for curing so­
cial evils by a reduction of individual rightS.294 To take this path,in 
his opinion, even in innocence, could well lead to the irretrievable 
impairment of fundamental constitutional protections.295 
Justice Brennan believed that the rejection of Aguilar-Spinelli 
288. 103 S. Ct. at 235 I (Brennan, I., dissenting). 
289. Id. at 2359. 
290. /d. 
291. Id (quoting id. at 2350 (White, I., concurring in the judgment). 
292. /d. at 2359 (Brennan, I., dissenting). 
293. Id. 
294. Id. 
295. Id. For a recent example of the Court's "concern" over these "horrors," see 
United States v. Place, 103 S. Ct. 2637 (1983), where the Court, in its desire to legitimize 
unorthodox law enforcement methods of combatting drug trafficking, reached out to re­
solve the constitutionality of the seizure of personal luggage on less than probable cause 
and the exposure of that luggage to a trained narcotics detection dog. See id. at 2646 
(Brennan, I., concurring); see also id. at 2652-53 (Blackmun, I., concurring)(criticizing 
the Court's "haste to resolve the dog-sniff issue"). 
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struck at the heart of "the judiciary's role as the only effective guard­
ian of [flourth [a]mendment rights."296 In recognition of this role. 
the Supreme Court had developed a set of coherent rules governing 
a magistrate's assessment of applications for warrants and the show­
ings that are required to support a finding of probable cause.297 This 
was deemed necessary to ensure that only a neutral and detached 
magistrate should determine whether there is probable cause to sup­
port the issuance of a warrant.298 The Supreme Court. in order to 
emphasize the role of the magistrate as "an independent arbiter" of 
probable cause, and to insure that searches and seizures are not ef­
fected on less than probable cause. has insisted, as Justice Brennan 
noted, that law enforcement officers provide magistrates with the un­
derlying facts and circumstances that support their conclusions of 
criminal activity or wrongdoing.299 This insistence resulted in the 
Aguilar-Spinelli rules, which have served to advance the substantive 
value. under fourth amendment jurisprudence. that findings of prob­
able cause. and attendant intrusions upon individual security and 
privacy. should not be sanctioned unless there has been some assur­
ance that the information on which they are based has been obtained 
in a reliable way by a credible person.3OO 
As applied to police officers, Justice Brennan explained. the 
Aguilar-Spinelli standards focus on the way in which the information 
has been acquired. As applied to informants, the rules focus on the 
credibility or honesty of the informant and on the reliability of the 
way in which the information has been obtained.301 
Insofar as it is more complicated. Justice Brennan observed, an 
evaluation of affidavits based on hearsay information involves "a 
more difficult inquiry."302 Thus, the nature of the process suggests a 
need to structure the inquiry to ensure a greater degree of accuracy. 
The standards announced in Aguilar, and refined by Spinelli. have 
fulfilled that need.303 The standards inform law officers of what in­
formation they have to provide and inform magistrates of what in­
formation "they should demand."304 Further, continued Justice 
Brennan, the standards also inform magistrates of the subsidiary 
296. 103 S. Ct. at 2351 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
297. £d. 
298. £d. 
299. Id. at 2352. 
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findings they are required to make in order to make an ultimate find­
ing of probable cause.30S Accordingly, by requiring law officers to 
provide certain crucial information to magistrates, and by structur­
ing probable cause inquiries by magistrates, the Aguilar-Spinelli 
standards function to assure the role of the magistrate as an "in­
dependent arbiter" of probable cause, ensure a greater degree of ac­
curacy in probable cause determinations, and advance the 
"important process value, which is intimately related to substantive 
[flourth [a]mendment concerns," of having neutral and independent 
magistrates, and not the police, or informants, determine whether 
there exists probable cause to support the issuance of a warrant.306 
It was apparent, therefore, to Justice Brennan, that the tests es­
tablished by Aguilar and Spinelli structure the magistrate's probable 
cause inquiry and, more importantly, guard against arbitrary intru­
sions upon the security and privacy of the individual that are sup­
ported by inadequate findings of probable cause.307 To Justice 
Brennan, there was nothing inconsistent between the rules and their 
"effects" and a "'practical, nontechnical' conception of probable 
cause."308 Once a magistrate has determined, argued Justice Bren­
nan, that he has been presented with information that he can reason­
ably conclude has been obtained in a reliable way by a credible 
person, he will have "ample room to use his common sense and to 
apply a practical, nontechnical conception of probable cause."309 
Justice Brennan found the structure provided by Aguilar­
Spinelli particularly beneficial to probable cause analysis of tips 
from anonymous informants. "By definition, nothing is known 
about an anonymous informant's identity, honesty, or reliability."310 
There was no basis for treating such persons as presumptively relia­
ble, and it could not be assumed that information provided by them 
had been obtained in a reliable way. Certainly, as Justice Brennan 
viewed the situation, if conclusory allegations of wrongdoing are un­
305. Id. 
306. Id. at 2355, 2356 n.6; see Spinel/i, 393 u.S. at 415-16. 
307. 103 S. Ct. at 2356 n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
308. Id. at 2357. 
309. /d. at 2357-58. 
310. Id. at 2356. It has been suggested that anonymous informants should be 
treated as presumptively unreliable, as their motives cannot be properly assessed by 
either the police or magistrates, and neither the police nor magistrates can possibly know 
how informants have obtained their information, or be able to secure additional informa­
tion from them. See Comment, Anonymous Tips, Corroboration, and Probable Cause: 
Reconciling the Spinelli/Draper Dichotomy in llinois v. Gates, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 99, 
107 (1982). 
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acceptable when provided by the police, who are presumptively reli­
able, or from known informants, then there could not "possibly be 
any rational basis for accepting conclusory allegations from anony­
mous informants."311 Hence, as a means of assuring that probable 
cause findings, and attendant intrusions, are based on information 
provided by credible or honest persons who have acquired the infor­
mation in reliable way, the Aguilar-Spinelli rules "must be applied" 
to tips from anonymous informants.312 
The majority claimed that the Aguilar-Spinelli rules could not 
be reconciled with the fact that laymen frequently serve as magis­
trates.313 Justice Brennan rejected this claim and argued that the 
rules not only helped to structure probable cause inquiries, but also, 
if "properly interpreted," could actually assist the nonlawyer magis­
trate in making determinations of probable cause.314 
Justice Brennan closed his dissenting opinion by taking the ma­
jority to task for replacing Aguilar-Spinelli with a test that provided 
no assurance that magistrates rather than police, or informants, 
would continue to make determinations of probable cause; that im­
posed no structure on probable cause inquiries by magistrates; and 
that invited "the possibility that intrusions [might] be justified on less 
than reliable information from an honest or credible person."315 
"[T]oday's decision," in his opinion, "threatens to 'obliterate one of 
the most. fundamental distinctions between our form of g<?vernment, 
where officers are under the law, and the police-state where they are 
the law.' "316 
The most unremarkable aspect of Gates was the result it 
reached. Granted that the informant was anonymous, and did not 
have a prior record of reliability; nevertheless, his report did contain 
considerable detail about the operation of an interstate drug enter­
prise. Furthermore, his tip contained information of a character 
likely obtained only from the defendants themselves, or from some­
one familiar with the inner workings of their operation. Thus, it 
would have been proper for a magistrate to conclude that the in­
former, while anonymous and with no prior record of trustworthi­
311. 103 S. Ct. at 2356 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
312. Id. 
313. Id. at 2358 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see id. at 2330-31. 
314. Id. at 2358 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
315. Id. at 2359 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 415-16. 
316. 103 S. Ct. at 2539 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 
333 U.S. 10, 17 (1948» (emphasis added). 
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ness, had access to reliable information of the Gates' alleged drug 
activities .. 
Although nothing was known of the informant's honesty or the 
reliability of his sources, any deficiences were compensated by the 
substantial amount of corroboration of the tip by independent police 
work. Hence, when the magistrate was presented with such a range 
of details, coupled with the degree of corroboration developed 
through police investigation, he had before him a substantial show­
ing of facts from which an inference could reasonably be drawn that 
the informer was a credible person who had gathered his informa­
tion in a reliable way. Accordingly, probable cause had been estab­
lished for the issuance of the warrant. 
Although Gates represents a step backward in fourth amend­
ment jurisprudence, it was a step which gained impetus from deci­
sions such as Brethauer, Palanza, and Bridger.317 An excessive 
desire to exploit an ever-expanding concept of individual liberties 
has already brought about a backlash resulting in a retrenchment of 
fifth amendment318 and habeas COrpUS319 protections. Unfortu­
nately, as the holding in Gates demonstrates, an "overly technical 
view"320 of supporting affidavits for warrants may also lead to "an 
evisceration of the probable cause standard" under the fourth 
amendment.32\ In our zeal to strictly enforce procedural rules, and 
to devise remedies for real or imagined injustices, we, of the legal 
and judicial communities, have lost sight of substantive justice, and 
have invited both the condemnation of the public322 and the counter­
attacks of reactionary ideologues who, under the banners of effective 
law enforcement and common sense, are busily engaged in disman­
tling the basic constitutional structure of this country. 
V. ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE 
In Gates, Justice Rehnquist mounted a three-pronged attack on 
the warrant machinery contemplated by the fourth amendment. 
317. See supra text accompanying notes 120-57. 
318. See, e.g., Oregon v. Bradshaw, 103 S. Ct. 2830, 2834-35 (1983) (plurality 
opinion). 
319. See Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 546-47, 549-52 (1981); Wainwright v. 
Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87-90 (1977), relt'g denied, 434 U.S. 880 (1977); Francis v. Henderson, 
425 U.S. 536, 542 (1976). 
320. United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 589 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
321. Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2350 (White, J., concurring). 
322. See Morris v. Siappy, 103 S. Ct. 1610, 1618 (1983); Pound, The Causes of 
Popular Dissatisfaction witlt tlte Administration of Justice, 29 ABA ANNUAL REp. 395, 
404-06 (1906). 
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First, he relaxed the standard for evaluating the probable cause suffi­
ciency of affidavits containing hearsay information from informants. 
Second, he diminished the role of the independent magistrate in the 
warrant process, by having him adopt a more sympathetic and per­
missive view toward police practices in the name of common sense 
and effective law enforcement. Finally, he laid the groundwork for 
altering the meaning of probable cause, to the detriment of individ­
ual rights. It is this multi-faceted assault on the warrant machinery, 
and its long-term implications for fourth amendment jurisprudence, 
that is so disturbing about Gales. 
The Aguilar-Spinelli rules were established as a reaction of the 
Supreme Court to "bare bones" affidavits containing mere con­
clusory allegations of criminal wrongdoing. The standards laid 
down by the rules reflected the Court's concern that the crucial role 
of an independent judiciary in conducting probable cause inquiries 
was being compromised by magistrates who were paying undue def­
erence to claims of probable cause by law enforcement officers that 
were not supported by a substantial factual basis. Thus, the stan­
dards were designed to enhance the integrity of the warrant process 
by preserving the independence and objectivity of the judiciary, and 
to ensure a greater degree of accuracy in probable cause 
determinations. 
The Aguilar-Spinelli rules, however, were not written in stone, 
and certainly could have been improved upon by clarifying the effect 
of corroborating information on the basis-of-knowledge test. In fact, 
Justice White, in his Gales concurrence, proposed just such a clarifi­
cation.323 Instead, however, the Court saw fit to repudiate Aguilar­
Spinelli. In so doing, the Gales Court struck at the integrity and 
independence of the judiciary in the warrant process. It did this by 
downgrading the magistrate's central role in making determinations 
of probable cause, and by encouraging the magistrate to abdicate his 
responsibility in the probable cause process by deferring to the judg­
ment of police officers in the name of effective law enforcement and 
common sense. 
As this article has attempted to show, the centerpieces of the 
warrant machinery under the fourth amendment are an independent 
judiciary and the standard of probable cause.324 The Aguilar­
Spinelli rules implemented the Supreme Court's commitment to 
these principles, and were not at all inconsistent with any notions of 
323. 103 S. Ct. at 2350-51 (White, J., concurring in the judgment). 
324. See supra text accompanying notes 7-57. 
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effective law enforcement and common sense. Although application 
of the rules created some problems, they were not of such a serious 
or fundamental nature as to warrant outright repudiation. Yet, this 
is exactly the drastic remedy upon which the Gates majority seized. 
In so doing, the majority replaced theAguilar-Spinelli analysis with a 
totality-of-the-circumstances approach that lacks sufficient specific­
ity and analytical structure to adequately inform magistrates as to 
what standard is required to protect the right of privacy secured by 
the fourth amendment. The reader must ask himself, "Why?" Why 
was it so necessary, so imperative, to reject and overrule Aguilar­
Spinelli? Why wasn't clarification or modification invoked? Were 
these alternatives even considered? If not, why not? 
The answers to these questions lie not in the facts in Gates, nor 
in the need to combat the "horrors" of the drug trade. The answers 
are to be found in the basic legal philosophy of a current majority of 
the Supreme Court. More particularly, the answers lie in an under­
standing of the majority's perception of the relationship between 
government and citizen. This is the critical key to a true understand­
ing of Gates, one that strips the majority opinion of its graceful style 
and pretentious adherence to effective law enforcement consistent 
with constitutional principles. For underneath the Court's nostrum, 
lies a message of narrow vision that is at odds with the fundamental 
constitutional ideals upon which this country was established. The 
warrant machinery designed by the fourth amendment is central to 
these ideals, for it interposes an independent judiciary between the 
state and the individual. The key components of this machinery are 
a neutral magistrate and a standard of probable cause that reason­
ably protects the security and privacy interests of the individual 
without unduly hindering effective law enforcement. It is precisely 
in these areas that the implications of Gates are most disturbing, and 
where the clues to its true meaning, and portent of the future, are to 
be found. 
A. Deficiencies in the Basis-of-Knowledge Prong 
The first clue to Gates' true meaning appeared when Justice 
Rehnquist offered an example of how the two-pronged analysis, 
which had been directed into largely independent channels under 
Aguilar-Spinelli, would be applied under the new totality-of-the-cir­
cumstances approach. He cited United States v. Sellers 325 in support 
of the principle that a deficiency in the basis-of-knowledge prong of 
325. 483 F.2d 37 (5th Cir. 1973), cerl. denied, 417 U.S. 908 (1974). 
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a tip from an unusually reliable informant would not be fatal to a 
showing of probable cause. As Justice Rehnquist phrased the 
proposition: 
If, for example, a particular informant is known for the unu­
sual reliability of his predictions of certain types of criminal activ­
ities in a locality, his failure, in a particular case, to thoroughly set 
forth the basis of his knowledge surely should not serve as an ab­
solute bar to a finding of probable cause based on his tip.326 
Although the Fifth Circuit, in Sellers, had acknowledged that 
"the quantum of underlying circumstances which reveal the source 
of the informer's knowledge necessary to sustain the affidavit is 
clearly less than in cases where the indicia of informer reliability is 
less dramatic," the court actually upheld the affidavit at issue pri­
marily on the basis of the "wealth of detail" supplied by the inform­
ant-a "wealth" that "outline[d] the administrative hierarchy of the 
[defendants'] bookmaking operation"-from which the magistrate 
"could have reasonably inferred" that the information was either the 
product of the informant's personal knowledge or that the informer 
had direct access to the defendants' gambling operation.327 This 
analysis in Sellers is thoroughly consistent with the Draper analysis 
as well as with the Spinelli majority where Justice Harlan reasoned 
that, in the absence of a statement detailing the circumstances in 
which the information had been gathered, a description of a defend­
ant's criminal activity in sufficient detail would permit the reviewing 
magistrate to reasonably infer that the informant had obtained his 
information or knowledge in a reliable way.328 Thus, Sellers, rather 
than being at odds with Spinelli, remained loyal to its principles. 
Moreover, how can "an informant's . . . 'basis of knowledge' 
[be] ... highly relevant in determining the value of his report," as 
Justice Rehnquist acknowledged in Gales ,329 and yet remain suffi­
ciently irrelevant that a "failure ... to thoroughly set [it] forth [will] 
. . . not serve as an absolute bar to a finding of probable cause. . . 
[?]"330 Unfortunately, the Court offers no meaningful guidance to 
magistrates beyond some general appeal to their common sense and 
practical good judgment. Apparently, "bare bones" affidavits based 
326. 103 S. Ct. at 2329 (emphasis added). 
327. 483 F.2d at 41. 
328. 393 U.S. at 416-17; accord, Gales, 103 S. Ct. at 2347 n.20 (White, J., concur­
ring in the judgment). 
329. 103 S. Ct. at 2327. 
330. Id. at 2329. 
381 1983) PROBABLE CAUSE Al'TER GATES 
upon nothing more than mere conclusory allegations of criminal 
wrongdoing will not be sufficient.331 And, when an affidavit contains 
"anything more," then "it appears that the question whether the 
probable cause standard is to be diluted is left to the common-sense 
judgments of issuing magistrates."332 
The net result, however, is to reduce the central importance of 
the role of an independent judiciary in probable cause inquiries, and 
to correspondingly enhance the role of the police and their infor­
mants. This is readily apparent from the majority's emphasis upon 
the past reliability of an informant, which, under the Court's new 
equation, may be resorted to to compensate for a deficiency in the 
basis of knowledge for a tip. Furthermore, this interpretation is rein­
forced by the majority's belief that the Aguilar-Spinelli rules are in­
consistent with the significant role played by laymen in the warrant 
process, where "many warrants are - quite properly. . . - issued 
on the basis of nontechnical, common-sense judgments of laymen 
applying a standard less demanding than those used in more formal 
legal proceedings."333 Similarly, the majority believed that the rules 
"seriously imped[ed] the task of law enforcement," and "greatly di­
minished [the] value [of anonymous tips] in police work."334 While 
Justice Rehnquist denied that this was SO,335 one is left with the im­
pression, as correctly perceived by Justice Brennan, that the majority 
employed words, "such as 'practical,' 'nontechnical,' and 'common­
sense,' as . . . but code words for an overly permissive attitude to­
wards police practices in derogation of the rights secured by the 
[t]ourth [a]mendment."336 Practicality and common sense have 
their place in the law, but we should not pay homage to them at the 
expense of basic constitutional rights. The message from Gates, 
therefore, comes through loud and clear that magistrates should pay 
more respect to the claims of law enforcement officers, who know far 
more about the ways of criminals and what is needed to combat their 
antisocial practices, and less attention to analytical assessments of 
probable cause. Any standard that does not expressly require, as a 
prerequisite to the issuance of a warrant, a substantial showing of 
facts from which an inference may be reasonably drawn that the in­
former is a credible person and that his information was obtained or 
331. Id. at 2332. 
332. Id. at 2350 (White, J., concurring in the judgment). 
333. /d. at 2330-31. 
334. Id. at 2331; see id. at 2332. 
335. See id. at 2333-34. 
336. Id. at 2359 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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gathered in a reliable way, will result in an evisceration of the prob­
able cause standard and an impairment of the rights secured by the 
fourth amendment. 337 
Finally, this analysis also applies to Justice Rehnquist's belief 
that an honest citizen's basis of knowledge need not be subjected to a 
searching inquiry.338 Simply because a citizen is honest does not 
mean that he is credible or that his information has been gathered in 
a reliable way. In short, one may be honest and still remain naive 
and gullible, easily swayed by the views or opinions of others, or by 
items of gossip circulated by them. 
B. Suspicion and the Standard ofProbable Cause 
The second, and more disturbing, implication emanating from 
Gates is the introduction of the concept of suspicion into probable 
cause analysis. This attempt to dilute the standard of probable cause 
touches roots that run deep in the constitutional history of this coun­
try, and requires extended discussion. 
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, had just presented 
"persuasive arguments" against according an informant's veracity or 
reliability and his basis of knowledge "independent status,"339 and 
followed this by citing illustrative examples of the new totality-of­
the-circumstances analysis, when suddenly, and quite unexpectedly, 
he introduced a discussion of the meaning of probable cause. Here, 
his choice of definitions was not simply intriguing; it bordered on the 
Byzantine. 
Justice Rehnquist looked back to Locke v. United States,340 de­
cided by the Supreme Court in 18l3, to find a definition of probable 
cause that would be appropriate for the 1983 totality-of-the-circum­
stances analysis that was superseding the Aguilar-Spinelli rules.341 
Further, he insisted that the definition proposed by Chief Justice 
Marshall, the author of Locke, had been made "in a closely related 
337. See id. at 2350 (White, J., concurring in the judgment). In a Draper-type 
situation, the wealth of detail supplied by an informant, coupled with a substantial de­
gree of corroboration developed by independent police work, will permit a magistrate to 
reasonably infer that the information has been obtained in a reliable way, either as the 
product of the informer's personal knowledge or by means of direct access to, or partici­
pation in, the defendant's criminal activities. See Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 417-18; id. at 426 
(White, J., concurring); Sellers, 483 F.2d at 41. 
338. 103 S. Ct. at 2329. 
339. Id. 
340. II U.S. (7 Cranch) 339 (1813). 
341. 103 S. Ct. at 2330. 
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context," presumably closely related to the Gates context.342 Justice 
Rehnquist then proceeded to quote Chief Justice Marshall's defini­
tion: "[T]he term 'probable cause', according to its usual accepta­
tion, means less than evidence which would justify condemnation 
. . . . It imports a seizure made under circumstances which warrant 
suspicion."343 
Justice Rehnquist did not let matters lie here however, as he 
seized upon a second opportunity to interject the concept of suspi­
cion into probable cause analysis. The opportunity presented itself 
within the following context. 
Toward the end of the Gates opinion, Justice Rehnquist pro­
ceeded to apply the totality-of-the-circumstances standard to Detec­
tive Mader's affidavit. During his discussion, he took the Illinois 
Supreme Court to task for downplaying the significance of the police 
corroboration of innocent activity on the part of the Gates'. After 
noting that seemingly innocent activity can become suspicious in the 
light of the informant's tip, and that "probable cause requires only a 
probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual 
showing of such activity," he observed: "In making a determination 
of probable cause the relevant inquiry is not whether particular con­
duct is 'innocent' or 'guilty,' but the degree ofsuspicion that attaches 
to particular types of non-criminal acts."344 
Again, the reader of Gates is confronted with a seemingly puz­
zling tum of events. A close examination will reveal, however, that 
Justice Rehnquist's choice of words was neither puzzling nor inex­
plicable; that, in fact, his choice was quite deliberate, and made with 
an eye to the future. 
At this point, it is important to take stock of what was, and what 
was not, at issue in Gates. The AgUilar-Spinelli rules were not cre­
ated in a vacuum; they were not established to satisfy themselves, or 
some hypothetical concept of probable cause, but rather to assist 
magistrates in seeing that affidavits containing hearsay reports from 
informants satisfied the constitutional requirement of probable 
cause. The standard for this requirement has remained relatively 
constant, at least since 1878, when it was explicated in Stacey v. Em­
ery,345 and certainly since 1925, when it was refined in Carroll v. 
United States .346 Thus, the issue before the Court in Gates was not 
342. ld. (emphasis added). 
343. ld. (quoting Locke, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 348) (emphasis added). 
344. 103 S. Ct. at 2335 n.13 (emphasis added). 
345. 97 U.S. 642, 645 (1878). 
346. 267 U.S. 132, 161-62 (1925). 
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the standard for probable cause, but whether Detective Mader's affi­
davit had in fact satisfied this standard. In short, the controversy 
surrounding Aguilar-Spinelli, and culminating in Gales, had been 
one of application to the standard of probable cause, and not one of 
conceptualization of that cause. Therefore, the rejection of the Agui­
lar-Spinelli analysis did not necessitate a reassessment, or a refine­
ment, of the probable cause standard. 
Since, however, the Gales majority saw fit to interject the stan­
dard of probable cause into the controversy surrounding Aguilar­
Spinelli, a review of its historical development and meaning IS m 
order. 
1. Historical Development of the Probable Cause Standard 
Although the practice of arresting a felon on probable suspicion 
was known at English common law,347 the American experience has 
. generally rejected any standard governing search-and-seizure proce­
dures that does not satisfy the standard of probable cause.348 The 
347. See Mure v. Kaye, 128 Eng. Rep. 239, 242-43 (C.P. 1811) (Mansfield, c.J.); id. 
at 243 (Heath, J.); id. at 243 (Chambre, J.); 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *290; I J. 
CHITTY, CRIMINAL LAW 13-15, 21, 22, 24, 31, 33-34 (1816); I M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE 
CROWN 579-80 (1778); 2 M. HALE, supra, at 108-10; 2 W. HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE 
CROWN 84-85 (1721); 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 602 (1923) 
(practice was regarded "as perfectly legal at the end of the seventeenth century"); 5 W. 
HOLDSWORTH, supra at 191; see also United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 429 (1976) 
(powell, J., concurring). Holdsworth traced this development to a new application of the 
rules governing the hue and cry. 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra, at 603-04. 
It must be noted, however, that the common law tended to employ the terms "prob­
able cause," "supsicion," and "suspect" interchangeably. See J. LANDYNSKI, supra note 
33, at 27 n.34. For examples of this, see I J. CHITTY, supra, at 34 (reasonable suspicion of 
guilt, or reasonable ground to suspect, defined as "such a probable cause as might induce 
a discreet and impartial man to suspect the party to be guilty"); I M. HALE, supra, at 579­
80 ("probable caufe of fufpicion"). 
348. The Supreme Court has sanctioned a reduced standard of an articulable and 
objectively reasonable suspicion in only limited situations; and then, only where the law 
enforcement need is special, and the intrusion is less invasive both as to scope and dura­
tion than either a full-blown search or a full-scale arrest. See Michigan v. Long, 103 S. 
Ct. 3469, 3480-82 (1983) (warrantless area search of passenger compartment for weapons 
during an investigative stop of a motor vehicle); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 
703-05 (1981) (temporary detention on less than probable cause of owner or occupant of 
residence while the police are executing a search warrant for the premises); United States 
v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18, 421-22 (1981) (border paJrol search involving a brief 
investigative stop of a motor vehicle on a particularized suspicion of being involved in 
criminal activity); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878-82, 884 (1975) 
(roving border patrols briefly stopping motor vehicles on reasonable suspicion for illegal 
immigrants, where intrusion is modest, there is no search of vehicle or its occupants, and 
visual inspection is limited to those parts of vehicle which can be viewed by anyone 
standing alongside of it); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110-12 (1977) (per 
curiam) (limited search of driver of motor vehicle for weapons on basis of reasonable 
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standard, in short, is the rule, not the exception, of fourth amend­
ment jurisprudence. Consistent with this philosophy is the Supreme 
Court's commitment to the requirement of probable cause, a "re­
quirement. ..[which] has roots that are deep in our history."349 
Thus, the Court has acknowledged that "[h]ostility to seizures based 
on mere suspicion was a prime motivation for the adoption of the 
[f]ourth [a]mendment. ..."350 
This hostility was reflected in early American cases, decided 
shortly after the adoption of the fourth amendment, condemning the 
practice of issuing warrants on suspicion.35I It was further rein­
forced by Coke's concern for the security and privacy of the individ­
ual in his home, if he were subjected to intrusions supported only by 
suspicion,352 a fact that could not have been lost upon the framers of 
the fourth amendment. 353 In a similar vein, Lord Camden, in Wilkes 
v. WOOd,354 condemned the issuance of general warrants authorizing 
the arrest of unnamed persons, connected with an alleged seditious 
libel, and the seizure of their papers on suspicion. He stated: 
belief that detainee is armed and dangerous); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147-48 
(1972) (same as Mimms); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,24,27,29-31 (1968) (protective frisk 
of detainee for weapons). 
Although the Court has sanctioned investigative detentions on less than probable 
cause, it has cautioned that they must be of limited duration, and last "no longer than is 
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop." Florida v. Royer, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1325 
(1983) (plurality opinion). Similarly, a further limitation requires that the investigative 
methods employed by a law enforcement officer should be the "least intrusive means 
reasonably available" to verify or dispel his suspicion in "a short period of time." Id. 
The burden is on the prosecution to demonstrate that the detention was sufficiently lim­
ited in duration and scope to satisty the requirements of an investigative seizure on rea­
sonable suspicion. Id. at 1326. 
What these cases point up is that the greater the intrusion into the individual's free­
dom of movement, the stronger the justification for the restraint must be. United States 
v. Vasquez, 638 F.2d 507, 520 (2d Cir. 1980), cerl. denied, 454 U.S. 975 (1981). Thus, if 
the suspect's liberty of movement is sufficiently curtailed to constitute an arrest under the 
fourth amendment, then it must be supported by probable cause. Dunaway v. New 
York, 442 U.S. 200, 212-16 (1979). 
349. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100 (1959). 
350. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213 (1979)(emphasis added). 
351. See, e.g., Conner v. Commonwealth, 3 Binn. 38, 44 (Pa. 1810); if. Common­
wealth v. Dana, 43 Mass. (2 Met.) 329, 334-36 (1841) (upholding a warrant issued on the 
basis of probable cause, and favorably comparing such a warrant to one issued on mere 
suspicion). 
352. E. COKE, FOURTH INSTITUTE 178 (1644); accord Entick v. Carrington, 19 
Howell's St. Tr. 1029, 1073-74 (C.P. 1765). 
353. Lord Coke was "widely recognized by the American colonists 'as the greatest 
authority of his time on the laws of England.'" Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 594 
(1980) (quoting A. HOWARD, THE ROAD FROM RUNNYMEDE; MAGNA CARTA AND CON­
STITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA 119 (1968». 
354. 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (C.P. 1763). 
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[These warrants amount to] a discretionary power given to mes­
sengers to search wherever their suspicions may chance to fall. If 
such a power is truly invested in a Secretary of State, and he can 
delegate this power, it certainly may affect the person and prop­
erty of every man in this kingdom, and is totally subversive of the 
liberty of the subject.355 
Finally, the hostility to the issuance of warrants on suspicion re­
ceived approbation in the "celebrated judgment"356 ofEntick v. Car­
rington ,357 where, in the process of condemning general warrants to 
search on suspicion any home for evidence of seditious libel, Lord 
Camden inquired that "if suspicion at large should be a ground of 
search, . . . whose house would be safe?"358 
Lord Camden's disapproving inquiry is not without signifi­
cance. In Boyd v. United States ,359 which has been described by the 
Supreme Court as "[t]he leading case on the subject of search and 
seizure,"360 and by Justice Brandeis as "a case that will be 
remembered as long as civil liberty lives in the United States,"361 the 
Court described the impact of Entick on the framers of the fourth 
amendment in these terms: 
It was welcomed and applauded by the lovers of liberty in the 
colonies as well as in the mother country. . . 
As every American statesmen [sic], during our revolutionary 
and formative period as a nation, was undoubtedly familiar with 
this monument of English freedom, and considered it as the true 
and ultimate expression of constitutional law, it may be confi­
dently asserted that its propositions were in the minds of those 
who framed the [f]ourth [a]mendment to the Constitution, and 
were considered as sufficiently explanatory of what was meant by 
unreasonable searches and seizures. . . . 
Can we doubt that when the [f]ourth ...[a]mendment[] to the 
Constitution of the United States [was] penned and adopted, the 
language of Lord Camden was relied on as expressing the true 
doctrine on the subject of searches and seizures, and as furnishing 
the true criteria of the reasonable and "unreasonable" character of 
355. Id. at 498 (emphasis added); see Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 
728-29 (1961). 
356. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 627 (1886). 
357. 19 Howell's St. Tr. 1029 (C.P. 1765). 
358. Id. at 1073-74 (emphasis added); see id at 1063-72. 
359. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
360. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 147; accord, One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 
380 U.S. 693, 696 (1965). 
361. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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[searches and seizures under the fourth amendment]?362 
In England, as Wilkes and Entick demonstrated, the fear was of 
the dreaded general warrant, which permitted the indiscriminate 
search of private residences on mere suspicion. In the American col­
onies, a similar fear existed of writs of assistance, which also permit­
ted intrusions into the home on less than probable cause.363 Thus it 
was search on mere suspicion that facilitated the indiscriminate exe­
cution of these feared processes, and created what amounted to little 
more than roving commissions authorizing search and seizure on the 
discretionary suspicion of petty officers. As history teaches, it was in 
reaction to these practices, which encouraged arbitrary governmen­
tal intrusions upon ''the sanctity of a man's home and privacies of 
life,"364 that the fourth amendment was enacted.36s 
As this review has indicated, the choice of probable cause as the 
standard by which privacy is reasonably invaded under the aegis of 
the fourth amendment was no accident of history. It reflected the 
American distaste for the excesses of the English crown in pursuing a 
harsh policy of collecting taxes from the colonists. While the main 
vice of the Crown's processes was the virtually unlimited authority 
that they conferred upon the officers who were entrusted with their 
execution, that very execution was facilitated by the reduced stan­
dard of suspicion. Hence, the framers of the fourth amendment set­
tled upon the higher standard of probable cause that would 
reasonably accommodate the legitimate concerns of society for effec­
tive law enforcement without jeopardizing the security and privacy 
interests of the individual. The requirement of probable cause was 
specifically mandated by the warrant clause of the fourth amend­
ment, which established "the root principle of judicial superinten­
362. 116 U.S. at 626-30. 
363. For discussion of opposition by the American colonists to general writs of 
assistance, issued on mere suspicion, see J. Frese, supra note 7, at 178-300. 
364. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886). 
365. See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 220 (1981); Payton v. New York, 
445 U.S. 573, 583 & n.21 (1980); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 301 (1967); Stanford 
v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481-82 (1965); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 454 (1963) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 363-66 (1959), overruled on 
other grounds, Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); Weeks v. United States, 
232 U.S. 383, 389-90 (1914); Commonwealth v. Dana, 43 Mass. (2 Met.) 329, 334-36 
(1841); B. SCHWARTZ, THE GREAT RIGHTS OF MANKIND: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN 
BILL OF RIGHTS 196 (1977); J. Frese, supra note 7, at 300; see a/so Harris v. United 
States, 331 U.S. 145, 157-63 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (because of historical 
abuses, search warrants require great specificity, and may be issued only on adequate 
grounds). 
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dence of searches and seizures."366 
2. Conceptualization of the Respective Terms 
Probable cause is a flexible concept which does not lend itself to 
rigid analysis or precise definition.367 Its meaning, therefore, must 
be found in the particular facts and circumstances of each case - in 
short, within the context peculiar to each situation.368 Within this 
framework, the courts have striven for a definition that, while not 
precise, does convey a discernible concept capable of reasonably 
consistent application. 
Under the fourth amendment, as its warrant clause commands, 
probable cause is a prerequisite for the issuance of a valid war­
rant.369 Probable cause is established for a search warrant when the 
facts and circumstances within an affiant's knowledge, and of which 
he has reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient in them­
selves to warrant a man of reasonable caution and prudence to be­
lieve that370 items subject to seizure are presently upon a particular 
person or situated within a specified place or thing;371 or, for an ar­
rest warrant, a criminal offense has been, or is being, committed by a 
particular individual.372 The standard thus required for the exist­
ence of probable cause is nothing less than a reasonable belief.373 
It is clear that neither proof beyond a reasonable doubt374 nor a 
366. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 454 n.6 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(emphasis added). 
367. See Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2328-29; United States v. Sorrells, 714 F.2d 1522, 1528 
(lith Cir. 1983); J. LANDYNSKI, supra note 33, at 46. 
368. See Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2328; N. LASSON, supra note 18, at 120. 
369. See authorities cited supra note 18. 
370. Texas v. Brown, 103 S. Ct. 1535, 1543 (1983) (plurality opinion); Berger v. 
New York, 388 U.S. 41, 55 (1967); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949); 
Carroll, 267 U.S. at 162; Stacey v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642, 645 (1878); United States v. 
Wylie, 705 F.2d 1388, 1392 (4th Cir. 1983); see Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 
(1959). 
371. J. LANDYNSKI, supra note 33, at 46; N. LASSON, supra note 18, at 129. 
372. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 55 (1967); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 
(1964); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949); United States v. Wallraff, 
705 F.2d 980, 990 (8th Cir. 1983); Commonwealth v. Perez, 357 Mass. 290, 300, 258 N.E. 
2d 1,7 (1970); see United States v. Pepple, 707 F.2d 261, 263 (6th Cir. 1983); J. LANDYN­
SKI, supra note 33, at 46; N. LASSON, supra note 18, at 129. 
373. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 55 (1967); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89,91 
(1964); Draper, 358 U.S. at 313; Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949); 
Carroll, 267 U.S. at 161-62; Stacey v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642, 645 (1878); United States v. 
Kolodziej, 706 F.2d 590, 598 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Dill, 693 F.2d 1Ol2, 1014 
(10th Cir. 1982); Commonwealth v. Perez, 357 Mass. 290, 301, 258 N.E.2d I, 7 (1970). 
374. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174-75 (1949); Commonwealth v. Pe­
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prima Jacie showing is required.375 More than "bare" suspicion, 
since Chief Justice Marshall's time,376 or " 'reasonable cause to sus­
pect,' "377 or even " 'strong reason to suspect,' "378 is required. Any­
thing less than a reasonable belief, or any "relaxation of the 
fundamental requirements of probable cause," would leave innocent 
persons at the discretionary mercy of law enforcement officials.379 
Hence, a requirement of mere suspicion would severely undermine 
the fundamental human right of freedom.380 This position is con­
firmed by an analysis of the meaning (and import) of suspicion. 
"Suspicion," which requires no real foundation for its existence, 
is weaker than "belief,"381 which, of necessity, is based on at least 
assumed facts. 382 Suspicion involves the act of imagining or appre­
hending that something is so, without supporting proof or on only 
slight evidence.383 It is a concept that is well-known to the English­
speaking countries, having been in existence at least since the four­
teenth century, and is aroused to a substantial degree by conjec­
ture.384 Thus, suspicion is not synonymous with knowledge,385 
rez, 357 Mass. 290, 301, 258 N.E.2d 1,7 (1970); see United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 
584 (1971) (plurality opinion); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479 (1963). 
375. Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 419; United States v. Wallraff, 705 F.2d 980, 990 (8th Cir. 
1983). 
A finding of probable cause may rest on evidence that is not legally competent in 
criminal trial proceedings. Draper, 358 U.S. at 311-12; Brinegar v. United States, 338 
U.S. 160, 172-76 (1949); see Ventresca, 380 U.S. at 107-08; Jones v. United States, 362 
U.S. 257, 269-72 (1960) (hearsay may be the basis for the issuance of a warrant, so long 
as there is a "substantial basis" for crediting the hearsay). 
376. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949)(footnote omitted);see 
Florida v. Royer, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1325 (1983) (plurality opinion); Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 
418-19. 
377. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 612-13 (1977) (such cause to suspect 
"imposes a less stringent requirement than that of 'probable cause'" to search or arrest 
under the fourth amendment). 
378. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 101 (1959)(quoting Conner v. Common­
wealth, 3 Binn. 38, 43 (Pa. 1810». 
379. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479 (1963); Brinegar v. United 
States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949)("[t)o allow less [than probable cause) would be to leave 
law-abiding citizens at the mercy of the officers' whim or caprice"). 
380. See Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 101 (1959); Hogan & Snee, The Mc­
Nabb-Mallory Rule: Its Rise, Rationale, and Rescue, 47GEO. L.J. I, 22 (1958). 
381. See Cook v. Singer Sewing Mach. Co., 138 Cal. App. 418, 421, 32 P.2d 430, 
431 (1934); Giddens v. Mirk, 4 Ga. 364,370 (1848); Gosser v. Gosser, 183 Pa. 499, 503, 38 
A. 1014, 1015 (1898). 
382. Cook v. Singer Sewing Mach. Co., 138 Cal. App. 418, 421, 32 P.2d 430, 431 
(1934). 
383. See People v. Superior Court, 85 Cal. App. 3d 1020, 1025, 149 Cal. Rptr. 349, 
352 (1978); State v. Barick, 143 Mont. 273, 283, 389 P.2d 170, 175 (1964); 9 THE OXFORD 
DICTIONARY (part 2) 260 (1919). 
384. See 9 THE OXFORD DICTIONARY, supra note 383, at 260. 
385. Guarantee Co. orN. Am. v. Mechanics' Sav. Bank & Trust Co., 80 F. 766, 784 
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which may consist of credible information on material facts and cir­
cumstances sufficient in content and quality to generate a reasonable 
beliej386 that, in tum, will justify search-and-seizure activity by law 
enforcement officers.387 Accordingly, suspicion can never satisfy the 
criterion for belief, namely, a conclusion or condition of mind which 
results from a consideration of relevant facts and circumstances by 
an individual of reasonable prudence and caution.388 
The major distinguishing feature, therefore, between suspicion 
and belief lies in the respective foundations justifying each state of 
mind or mental process. In the case of suspicion, little if any sup­
porting basis is required. In the case of belief, the cornerstone of 
probable cause analysis,389 a stronger foundation is required, one 
that is secured by a factual predicate that warrants the requisite 
mental conviction or conclusion. Any attempt to sanction search­
and-seizure procedures governing the issuance of warrants on the 
basis of suspicion absent a factual foundation would severely 
threaten the continued vitality of the individual's right to personal 
privacy and security free from arbitrary intrusion by government 
agents. The relevant inquiry, in making determinations of probable 
cause, should be the degree of factual belief, as distinguished from 
conjecture, that is justified by particular types of innocent acts. 
Justice Rehnquist cannot read the requirement of probable 
cause out of the fourth amendment, but he can do the. next best 
thing: change its meaning. This, it is submitted, is what he has at­
(6th Cir. 1896), rev'd on other grounds, 173 U.S. 582 (1899); American Sur. Co. v. Pauly, 
72 F. 470, 477 (2d Cir. 1896), affd, 170 U.S. 133 (1898); see Tracerlab, Inc. v. Industrial 
Nucleonics Corp., 313 F.2d 97, 102 (1st Cir. 1963)(suspicion and knowledge are "poles 
apart on a continuum of understanding"). 
386. See Sackett v. Farmers State Bank, 209 Iowa 487, 495, 228 N.W. 51, 54 
. (1929); State v. Smith, 22 N.J. 59, 64-65, 123 A.2d 369, 372 (1956). 
387. See State v. Godette, 188 N.C. 497, 503-04, 125 S.E. 24, 28 (1924). 
388. Cook v. Singer Sewing Mach. Co., 138 Cal. App. 418, 421, 32 P.2d 430, 431 
(1934). Stated differently, a belief consists of the mental acceptance of the existence of a 
fact on the basis of evidence of which one is conscious. See Reed v. Fish Eng'g Corp., 76 
N.M. 760, 769,418 P.2d 537, 544 (1966)(Oman, J., dissenting); I THE OXFORD DICTION­
ARY (Part 2), at 782 (1888). 
In Smith v. Bouchier, 93 Eng. Rep. 989 (C.P. 1734), the court held that an arrest 
warrant, issued on the basis of an oath of suspicion by the plaintiff that he suspected that 
the defendant would run away, could not be justified under a custom which sanctioned 
the issuance of an arrest warrant on the basis of an oath of belief that the defendant 
would Bee.ld. at 989. The court reasoned that to suspect something was not the same as 
to believe it. Hence, a suspicion would not induce a belief and, therefore, was not a 
sufficient basis for invoking the custom. Id. 
389. See cases cited supra note 373. 
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tempted to do in Gales.390 
It bears repeating, as well as emphasis, that the issue in Gales, as 
it was also in both Aguilar and Spinelli, was not the standard of 
probable cause, but, rather, whether the affidavit in question had sat­
isfied that standard. Not surprisingly, therefore, neither party to the 
controversy questioned the efficacy of the probable cause standard. 
Rather, they joined issue on whether the information contained in 
390. This attempt may already be bearing fruition. See United States v. Mendoza, 
722 F.2d 96, 101-02 (5th Cir. 1983)(in assessing and finding probable cause, court ap­
pears to have applied standard of reasonable suspicion espoused by Justice Rehnquist in 
Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2335 n.13). 
Gates does not represent Justice Rehnquist's initial flirtation with the principles of 
suspicion while seeking an appropriate meaning for probable cause. In Texas v. Brown, 
103 S. Ct. 1535 (1983)(plurality opinion), Justice Rehnquist, while stating that the stan­
dard of probable cause is " a flexible, common-sense standard ...[that) merely requires 
that the facts available to the officer would 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the 
belief...that certain items may be [subject to seizure; in short, a) 'practical, nontechni­
cal' probability," analogized the process of assessing probable cause to the analysis of 
" 'particularized suspicion.''' Id at 1543 (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 
162 (1925); and Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949». He quoted the 
following passage from United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981): 
The process does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities. Long 
before the law of probabilities was articulated as such,practical people fornlU­
lated. certain common-sense conclusions about human behavior; jurors as 
factfinders are permitted to do the same - and so are law enforcement officers. 
Finally, the evidence thus collected must be seen and weighed not in terms of 
library analysis by scholars, but as understood by those versed in the field of 
law enforcement. 
103 S. Ct. at 1543 (emphasis added). 
Again, one is struck by the use of words such as "practical" and "common-sense" as 
but code words for an overly-deferential attitude toward law enforcement practices in 
derogation of the rights secured by the fourth amendment. It is also revealing, and quite 
symptomatic of his insensitivity to fourth amendment values, that Justice Rehnquist 
chose Cortez as an appropriate vehicle for favorable comparison with probable cause 
analysis. 
In Cortez, the Supreme Court was called upon to articulate a standard governing the 
reasonableness of warrantless investigative stops by the Border Patrol of motor vehicles 
on a particularized suspicion of being involved in criminal activity. In formulating the 
appropriate standard, the Court noted "the enormous difficulties of patrolling a 2,000­
mile open border," and that, "[o)f critical importance, [was the fact that) the officers 
knew that the area [where the stop under review was made) was a crossing point for 
illegal aliens." 449 U.S. at 418-19. 
These factors, while relevant to the reasonableness of an investigative stop of a mo­
tor vehicle at a border crossing, are singularly inappropriate for a critical assessment of 
the factors relevant to a proper determination of the existence of probable cause. This is 
especially true where warrants authorize forcible intrusions into the sanctity of the home, 
an area of heightened privacy interests under the fourth amendment. See Payton v. New 
York, 445 U.S. 573, 585-90 (1980); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561, 
565 (1976)(dictum); Dorman v. United States, 435 F. 2d 385, 389 (D.C. Cir. 1970)(en 
banc)("[f]reedom from intrusion into the home or dwelling is the archetype of the pri­
vacy protection secured by the [f]ourth [a)mendment"). 
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Detective Mader's affidavit had imparted sufficient information to 
the magistrate to satisfy that standard. Although the state had asked 
the Court to repudiate the Aguilar-Spinelli rules, at no time did it 
invite a reassessment of the meaning of probable cause. 
Rather than accepting the issues as framed by the parties, Jus­
tice Rehnquist seized upon the opportunity presented in Gates to call 
into question the very concept of probable cause. By so doing, he 
struck at the heart of the warrant machinery established by the 
fourth amendment. If the concept of probable cause - the stan­
dard by which privacy is reasonably invaded - is undercut, the very 
privacy interests it was aimed at securing will be diminished and 
proportionately weakened. Probable cause defines the criteria for 
reasonable intrusions upon the individual's security and privacy. 
When those criteria have been met, permission to breach the individ­
ual's privacy will be forthcoming. If those criteria have not been 
satisfied, permission will be withheld. That is precisely what Justice 
Rehnquist is attempting to alter through his Gates analysis. He is 
tipping the scales against the individual and in favor of the police by 
reducing the criteria for authorizing intrusions into the sanctity of 
the home and the security of the individual. 
C. 	 Customs and Maritime Searches and the Concept ofReasonable 
Suspicion 
As previously noted,391 Justice Rehnquist, in Gates, had in­
formed the reader that Chief Justice Marshall's conception of prob­
able cause in Locke had been made "in a closely related context," 
presumably closely related to the Gates context.392 A close examina­
tion will reveal, however, that the Locke context was anything but 
closely related to Gates, or, for that matter, to the warrant clause of 
the fourth amendment which governed Gates. 
As background, the reader will recall that Marshall, in his 
Locke opinion, had conceptualized probable cause in terms of "a 
seizure made under circumstances which warrantsuspicion."393 Two 
aspects of this concept are noteworthy. First, Marshall was defining 
probable cause solely in terms of a seizure, rather than with refer­
ence to both searches and seizures. Why, one may ask, did he con­
sider it appropriate to limit his discussion to seizures, thereby 
391. 	 See supra text accompanying note 342. 
392. 	 103 S. Ct. at 2330 (emphasis added). 
393. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 348 (emphasis added); see supra text accompanying 
notes 340-43. 
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excluding searches?394 Second, Marshall introduced the concept of 
suspicion into his analysis of probable cause. The question arises, 
why did the premier Chief Justice of the Supreme Court conceptual­
ize probable cause in terms of suspicion only a short time after the 
adoption of the fourth amendment if, as the Court has reminded us, 
"[h]ostility to seizures based on mere suspicion was a prime motiva­
tion for the adoption of the [flourth [a]mendment[?]"395 The an­
swers to these questions lie in the factual setting of Locke, which 
will reveal that Marshall's choice of terms was not surprising. 
Locke was a libel proceeding to forfeit a cargo of imported 
goods seized for violation of the revenue laws. "It presented," as the 
Supreme Court has noted, ''no question concerning the validity of a 
warrant ."396 More fundamentally, however, the practice of sanc­
tioning searches on suspicion for goods smuggled into the country in 
violation of the revenue or tariff laws has "been sustained from the 
earliest times," and was authorized as early as 1789.397 Similarly, in 
1790, the First Congress enacted a comprehensive statute authoriz­
ing customs officers to board and search, without even articulable 
suspicion, any vessel found within the nation's domestic waters.398 
These practices were affirmed in the revenue act of March 2, 1799, 
which formed the statutory basis for the libel of condemnation filed 
394. Although the standard of probable cause is the same for searches and 
seizures, see Giordenello, 357 U.S. at 485-86, it remains/actually noteworthy that Mar­
shall referred only to seizures. 
395. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213 (1979)(emphasis added); see supra 
text accompanying notes 347-66. 
396. Nathanson, 290 U.S. at 47 (emphasis added). 
397. ld See, e.g., Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, §23, 1 Stat. 29, 43 (1789)(current 
version at 19 U.S.C. §§ 482, 1461, 1462, 1467, 1496, 1499, 1582 (1982»(authorizing the 
opening and examination, "on suspicion of fraud," of packages of goods imported into 
the country);id § 24, 1 Stat. at 43 (current version at 19 U.S.C. §§ 482, 
1595(a)(1982»(authorizing searches of ships or vessels on "reason to suspect" that goods 
subject to duty are concealed therein, and sanctioning the issuance of search warrants for 
daytime searches of residences, stores, buildings, "or other place[s]" on "cause to sus­
pect" the concealment therein of imported goods "subject to duty"). Under present law, 
section 1595(a) requires the officer making a search of any dwellings, store or building to 
"have cause to suspect the presence. . .of any merchandise upon which the duties have 
not been paid ...." 19 U.S.C. § 1595(a)(1982); see United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 
606,616-17 & n. 12 (1977); Nathanson, 290 U.S. at 47; Carroll, 267 U.S. at 149-51; Boyd 
v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886); United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063, 
1079-81 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc). The Massachusetts colony had conferred similar pow­
ers on its local customs collector in the mid-seventeenth century. J. Frese, supra note 7, 
at 127-28. 
398. Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35, § 31, 1 Stat. 145, 164-65 (1790) (current version at 
19 U.S.c. § 1581(a) (1982»; see United States v. Villamonte-Mar.quez, 103 S. Ct. 2573, 
2577-78 (1983). 
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in Locke.399 
It is apparent, therefore, that Marshall was addressing the 
meaning of probable cause within the context of the seizure of smug­
gled goods or contraband. This is highlighted by the nature of the 
proceeding before the Locke Court: a libel for the condemnation of 
goods illegally imported into the country. It was confirmed by Mar­
shall's use of the word "condemnation," when he observed that 
probable cause "means less than evidence which would justify con­
demnation ."400 Hence, Marshall was correct when he observed that 
"in all cases of seizure [of smuggled goods]," the term probable 
cause "has a fixed and well known meaning. It imports a seizure 
made under circumstances which warrant suspicion."401 
An examination of the principal issue raised by the defendant in 
Locke further reinforces this interpretation. The defendant claimed 
that "just cause to suspect" that the goods seized had offended 
against the law was not enough to require him to produce exculpa­
tory evidence. "Guil~," he argued, "must be proved before the pre­
399. Act of March 2, 1799, ch. 22, §§ 67,68, I Stat. 627, 677-78 (1799) (current ver­
sion at 19 U.S.C. § 1581 (1982»; see Carroll, 267 U.S. at 151. 
The authority to conduct customs searches on less than probable cause has contin­
ued to the present time. See United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. 2573, 2579­
82 (1983); United States v. Herrera, 711 F.2d 1546, 1550, 1552-56 (lith Cir. 1983); United 
States v. Sandler, 644 F.2d 1163, 1165-66 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc); United States v. 
Kenney, 601 F.2d 211, 212-13 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam); United States v. Doe, 472 
F.2d 982, 984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 969 (1973); United States v. Glaziou, 402 
F.2d 8, 12-14 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1121 (1969); United States v. Burke, 
540 F. Supp. 1282, 1286-87 (D.P.R. 1982), affd, 716 F.2d 935 (1st Cir. 1983); United 
States v. Whitmore, 536 F. Supp. 1284, 1290-91 (D. Me. 1982), affd, 701 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 
1983) (per curiam); 14 U.S.c. § 89(a) (1982); 19 U.S.c. §§ 482, 1581(a) (1982). In addi­
tion, border searches may be conducted by customs officials without a warrant or prob­
able cause, or even mere suspicion. See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616-19 
(1977); Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153-54; Herrera, 711 F.2d at 1552 (dictum); see generally 
Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. at 2579-82 (boarding by customs officials of vessel in 
domestic waters providing ready access to open sea, without articulable suspicion of 
wrongdoing, to conduct an examination of vessel's documents, does not offend the fourth 
amendment). Such authority extends to documentary and safety inspection searches of 
vessels on the high seas without any antecedent or particularized suspicion of wrongdo­
ing. Burke, 716 F.2d at 937; United States v. Thompson, 710 F.2d 1500, 1504-06 (lith 
Cir. 1983); United States v. Hilton, 619 F.2d 127, 131 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 887 
(1980); see United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063, 1081-82, 1086 (5th Cir. 1980) (en 
banc). The authority further extends to searches of vessels on the high seas on reason­
able and articulable grounds for suspecting that they are engaged in criminal activity. 
United States v. Green, 671 F.2d 46, 53 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1135 (1982); 
Burke, 540 F. Supp. at 1287; see Herrera, 711 F.2d at 1550, 1552-56 (applying same 
standard to customs searches of non-private areas of vessels conducted in customs, as 
distinguished from international, waters); Williams, 617 F .2d at 1086-88. 
400. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 348 (emphasis added). 
401. Id. 
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sumption of innocence could be removed" from the case.402 With 
this, the Court disagreed.403 
Chief Justice Marshall noted that the statute governing these 
proceedings required that the burden of proof would be on anyone 
claiming the property previously seized for violation of the revenue 
laws, provided probable cause had been established" 'for such pros­
ecution."404 The previous reference to burden of proof ("the onus 
probandi") was contained in a statutory clause which stated that "in 
actions, suits or informations to be brought, where any seizure shall 
be made pursuant to this act," if the property seized was "claimed by 
any person, in every such case [the burden of proof would be on] 
such claimant."405 The subsequent reference to burden of proof, 
again being placed on "the claimant," came at the end of section 71 
of the Act of March 2, 1799, and contained a provision that qualified 
the previous general applicability of "the onus probandi" to all "such 
claimant[s]."406 This provision must have referred to "the onus pro­
bandi" applicable to "actions, suits or informations to be brought, 
where any seizure shall be made pursuant to this act ."407 These are 
the only references to "the onus probandi" contained in section 71, 
and in each instance it has specific applicability to a "claimant" of 
the property previously seized "pursuant to this act. "408 Therefore, 
the provision, in limiting the applicability of "the onus probandi," or 
burden of proof, to the claimant "only where probable cause is 
shown for such prosecution," can mean "only where probable cause 
is shown for such ['actions, suits or informations to be brought, 
where any seizure shall be made pursuant to this act']."409 
In sum, when Marshall characterized probable cause as having 
"a fixed and well known meaning[, which] imports a seizure made 
under circumstances which warrant suspicion,"41o he clearly had in 
mind its "meaning" in the law governing searches for goods smug­
gled into the country in violation of the revenue or tariff laws. It is 
only in this limited area of the law that probable cause has come to 
mean "circumstances which warrant suspicion."411 
402. ld. 
403. ld. 
404. ld. (quoting Act of March 2,1799, ch. 22 § 71,1 Stat. 627, 678 (1799». 
405. Act of March 2, 1799, ch. 22, § 71, 1 Stat. 627, 678 (1799) (repealed). 
406. ld. 
407. ld. (emphasis added). 
408. ld. 
409. ld. 
410. See 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) al 348. 
411. The defendant-claimant in Locke had argued that "[g]uilt. ..must be proved 
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The justification for customs and border searches or seizures on 
less than probable cause is based on the inherent authority of the 
sovereign "to protect its territorial integrity,"412 and to prevent 
smuggling, as well as to prevent prohibited articles from entering the 
country.413 Similarly, the need for a warrant, or for probable cause, 
prior to the boarding of a ship by government agents, is excused by 
the circumstances and exigencies of the maritime setting, which af­
ford individuals on a vessel a reduced expectation of privacy.414 
Thus, factual and circumstantial distinctions between maritime and 
land searches415 determine their respective reasonableness.416 This, 
of course, is but a corollary of the precept that the reasonableness of 
a particular search or seizure depends upon the peculiar facts and 
circumstances giving rise to its occurrence - the "total atmosphere 
of the case."417 
It is submitted, however, that the reduced, and even, in some 
instances, nonexistent standard of cause that is appropriate for cus­
toms and border s~arches is singularly inappropriate for land 
searches, and, in particular, for those searches conducted in the 
home,418 where privacy interests (and concerns) are most pro­
nounced,419 or on other fixed premises.420 While any search or 
before the presumption of innocence [could) be removed" from the case. II U.S. (7 
Cranch) at 348. Marshall rejected this claim by noting that the issue of burden of proof 
was governed by the applicable statute, and implicitly determining that probable cause 
had to be assessed within the context of the nature of the prosecution. See id. Thus, he 
rejected the defendant's argument that the standard required was that of prima facie 
evidence, and applied the "fixed and well known meaning," in the law governing contra­
band seized for violation of the revenue or tariff statutes, of "circumstances which war­
rant suspicion." Id. 
412. Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465, 472-73 (1979); see United States v. Ram­
sey, 431 U.S. 606, 616-20 (1977); Note, High on the Seas: Drug Smuggling, the Fourth 
Amendment, and Warrantless Searches at Sea, 93 HARv. L. REV. 725, 731-32 (1980). 
413. United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 125 
(1973). 
414. United States v. Herrera, 711 F.2d 1546, 1552 (lith Cir. 1983) (probable cause 
not required); United States v. Green, 671 F.2d 46, 53 (lst Cir. 1982) (warrant not re­
quired); see United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063, 1087-88 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc). 
415. "Land searches" means those searches conducted in the interior of the coun­
try, away from the border or its functional equivalent. 
416. See United States v. Herrera, 711 F.2d 1546, 1551 (lith Cir. 1983). 
417. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56,66 (1950); accord, Chimel v. Cali­
fornia, 395 U.S. 752, 765 (1969). 
418. Part of the search activity in Gates consisted of a search of the defendant's 
residence. 103 S. Ct. at 2326. 
419. See Michigan v. Clifford, 104 S. Ct. 641, 648 (1984) (plurality opinion); Pay­
ton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585-90 (1980); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 
543, 561, 565 (1976) (dictum); Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385, 389 (D.C. Cir. 
1970) (en banc). 
420. Cf. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 805-07 (1982) (searches of vessels or 
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seizure activity necessarily involves some degree of intrusiveness and 
disruption, not to mention its traumatic impact upon one's state of 
mind, the degree of intrusion upon privacy that may be occasioned 
by a customs or border search is hardly comparable to, and is, in 
fact, significantly different from, the severe interference with privacy 
resulting from a search of a home or other fixed premises.421 In the 
latter setting, the sharply defined privacy and security interests of the 
motor boats are not comparable to searches of residences or other fixed premises); United 
States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 125 (1973) (import restric­
tions an4 searches at the nation's borders rest on different considerations and different 
rules of constitutional law "from domestic regulations"); United States v. Thirty-Seven 
Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 376 (1971) (plurality opinion) (port-of-entry is not a traveler's 
home; individual's right to be let alone does not exempt his luggage from customs search, 
which is "an old practice. . .intimately associated with excluding illegal articles from the 
country"); Nathanson, 290 U.S. at 45-47 (customs agents seeking warrants for private 
residences must satisfy probable cause requirements of fourth amendment, mere affirm­
ance of suspicion or belief, without disclosure of supporting allegations of fact, not suffi­
cient; Court implicitly rejected cause-to-suspect standard for issuance of warrants under 
fourth amendment); Carroll, 267 U.S. at 149-53 (same as Ross); Boyd v. United States, 
116 U.S. 616, 623-24 (1885) (same as Ross); United States v. Green, 671 F.2d 46,53 (1st 
Cir. 1982) (circumstances and exigencies of maritime setting afford people on a vessel a 
lesser expectation of privacy than in their homes); United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 
1063, 1084, 1087-88 (5th Cir. 1980) (en bane) (there are substantial differences between 
maritime searches and searches of buildings and vehicles on land); United States v. 
Steinkoenig, 487 F.2d 225, 229 (5th Cir. 1973) (statute authorizing border searches will 
not sanction warrantless searches of a residence); United States v. Burke, 540 F. Supp. 
1282, 1286 (D.P.R. 1982) (same as Ross and Green), aJrd, 716 F.2d 935 (1st Cir. 1983). 
In Nathanson, the Third Circuit acknowledged that had the warrant in question 
been issued under authority of the prohibition laws (warrant had been issued for the 
seizure of liquor smuggled into the country), it would have been invalid, "since the affi­
davit was merely based upon cause to suspect and suspicion." Nathanson v. United 
States, 63 F.2d 937, 938 (3d Cir.), rev'd, 290 U.S. 41 (1933). The court sustained the 
warrant, however, under the tariff and customs laws, arguing that the government's pecu­
niary interest in the smuggled goods was sufficient to justify the issuance of the warrant, 
and that the search warrant, based on a sworn complaint phrased almost in the language 
of section 595 of the Tariff Act of 1930 did not violate the defendant's constitutional 
rights. fd. at 939; see Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, § 595(a), 46 Stat. 752 (current version 
at 19 U.S.c. § 1595(a) (1982». 
To the Supreme Court, the Third Circuit had "acted upon an erroneous view." 290 
U.S. at 46 (emphasis added). The Court perceived the issue to be whether the warrant 
was supported by probable cause, and concluded that it was not. 290 U.S. at 46-47. It 
would appear, therefore, that the Court implicitly rejected the cause-to-suspect standard 
for probable cause. For further discussion of Nathanson, see supra text accompanying 
notes 39-45. 
421. Cf, United States v. District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972) ("physical entry 
of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the [f1ourth [a)mendment is 
directed"); United States v. Kramer, 711 F.2d 789, 793 (7th Cir. 1983) (dictum) (fourth 
amendment protects individual's interest in peace and quiet by prohibiting searches that 
result in the physical disruption or ransacking of people's households). 
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individual require, as does the fourth amendment, the higher stan­
dard of probable cause. 
By contrast, customs and border searches protect an important 
national interest- the prevention of smuggling. Without the author­
ity to conduct such searches on less than probable cause, the govern­
ment would be virtually powerless to effectively police the nation's 
frontiers and prevent smuggling activities, in particular, the difficul­
ties posed by combating widespread drug smuggling operations 
would increase. Moreover, people crossing into the nation's territo­
rial waters know that they are likely to be searched, due to the exten­
sive governmental regulation of maritime and boating operations, 
thereby significantly reducing their reasonable expectations of pri­
vacy. Similarly, vessels are searched solely because they belong to a 
morally neutral class. These factors combine to suggest that customs 
searches on less than probable cause satisfy the requirement of rea­
sonableness under the fourth amendment.422 
The abuses attendant upon searches on suspicion were upper­
most in the minds of the framers of the fourth amendment when 
they insisted upon the requirement of probable cause. This choice 
was' not by accident. It was made with the knowledge and foresight, 
and with the intent that the integrity of the individual would better 
be served and preserved by this higher standard.423 The selection of 
the Constitution as the repository for this standard was also without 
accident. In this way did the framers seek to preserve individual 
rights from the vicissitudes and pressures of political and judicial 
change.424 Thus, any attempt to analogize the search of a person, his 
home, his papers, and his effects, conducted in the interior of the 
nation, to customs, maritime, or border searches is devoid of histori­
cal and analytical merit and misconceives the very purpose of the 
fourth amendment. 
The amendment was designed to protect the individual from ar­
bitrary and unwarranted intrusions upon his legitimate expectations 
of privacy, and thereby sought to secure him in his "personl], 
housel], papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
422. See United States v. Williams, 617 E2d 1063, 1085-88 (5th Cir, 1980) (en 
bane); see also id. at 1087-88. 
423. See JUpra text accompanying notes 347-66. 
424. Cf. THE FEDERALIST No, 78, at 491-92 (A. Hamilton) (B. Wright ed. 1961) 
(constitutional requirement of lifetime tenure for judicial officers will secure the indepen­
dence of the judiciary against legislative encroachments, and protect the rights of the 
individual from majoritarian excesses). 
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seizures."42s It was designed, in short, to protect people, not places, 
or papers, or effects.426 Note the very language of the amendment: 
"The right of thepeople to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated. . . ."427 
Under the constitutional command, it was the people, and only 
the people, who were endowed with the right to be secure against 
unreasonable searches and seizures. A search or seizure is reasonable 
or unreasonable, generally not because of the nature of what it seeks, 
but because of its fidelity or lack of fidelity to the requirements of the 
fourth amendment. Therefore, the attempt by Justice Rehnquist to 
characterize the Locke setting as "a closely related context"428 to the 
factual setting of Gates was both factually and jurisprudentially in­
accurate.429 The only relation between the two cases was that the 
quarry in each was contraband. But, as fourth amendment jurispru­
dence teaches, it is not the nature of the quest but rather an assess­
ment of both the invasion of the individual's privacy interests and 
the "promotion of legitimate governmental interests" through effec­
tive law enforcement that determines the standard of reasonableness 
applicable to search-and-seizure practices.43o Thus, a particular 
search or seizure may be permissible in one factual setting while im­
permissible in another setting, even though what is sought is the 
same in each instance.431 In delineating the constitutional safe­
guards applicable in particular contexts, a court should weigh the 
public interest against the privacy and security interests of the indi­
vidual under the fourth amendment.432 
Although the public interest in effective law enforcement is al­
ways a weighty consideration in formulating a standard of reasona­
bleness applicable in particular contexts, there are certain settings 
where the fourth amendment interests of the individual are pre-emi­
nent. For example, a warrantless search or seizure within the home is 
425. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
426. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351, 353 (1967). 
427. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added). 
428. Gales, 103 S. Ct. at 2330. 
429. Cf. United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 125 
(1973) (import restrictions and searches at the nation's borders rest on different consider­
ations and different rules of constitutuionallaw "from domestic regulations"). 
430. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979) (footnote omitted); see United 
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 555 (1976). 
431. See cases cited supra note 420. 
432. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 555 (1976). 
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"presumptively unreasonable."433 Conversely, objects subject to 
seizure, such as weapons or contraband, that are found in a public 
place may be lawfully seized by government agents without a war­
rant.434 And, the justifications for customs and border searches on 
less than probable cause are the compelling need and the inherent 
authority of the sovereign to protect its territorial integrity, and to 
prevent smuggling, as well as to prevent prohibited articles from en­
tering the country.435 Similarly, the circumstances and exigencies of 
the maritime setting, which afford individuals on a vessel a reduced 
expectation of privacy, will excuse the need for a warrant, or for 
probable cause, prior to the boarding of a ship by agents of the gov­
ernment.436 In sum, then, the scope of a constitutional safeguard will 
be defined by its purpose within a particular context. 
Finally, Justice Rehnquist ignored "traditional doctrine"437 by 
quoting Locke as implicit precedent for searches conducted in the 
interior of the country, and, in particular, for residential searches, 
such as took place in Gates.438 That doctrine requires that the prece­
dential value of a decision should be limited to the immediate con­
fines of the decision's factual setting. This means that language 
appearing in a particular decision is to be read in light of the deci­
sion's factual setting439 and should not be interpreted as a decision 
upon, or precedent for, an issue which the facts of the case do not 
present.440 Therefore, it is submitted that Locke had no precedential 
value for Gates, and should not have been accorded any such treat­
ment by Justice Rehnquist. 
D. The Impact of Gates on State Prosecutions 
l. 	 Federalism and the Standard of Protection Under State 
Law 
One of the great strengths of the American constitutional 
scheme is its diversity, which has permitted the development of a 
433. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980) (footnote omitted). 
434. Id. at 586-87 (dictum). 
435. See authorities cited supra notes 412-13. 
436. See cases cited supra note 414. 
437. Satty v. Nashville Gas Co., 522 F.2d 850, 853 (6th Cir. 1975). 
438. 103 S. Ct. at 2330. 
439. Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126, 132-33 (1944); Satty v. Nashville 
Gas Co., 522 F.2d 850,853 (6th Cir. 1975); accord, Communications Workers of Am. v. 
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 513 F.2d 1024, 1028 (2d Cir. 1975), vacated on other grounds, 
429 U.s. 1033 (1977); see Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399-400. (1821). 
440. United States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U.S. 228, 231 (1968); accord, United 
Gas Improvement Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 381 U.S. 392, 404 (1965). 
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system of shared responsibility between the national government 
and the several states. Not only does it provide for a series of checks 
and balances, but also it permits independent state sovereigns to ex­
ist within a federal framework of government. Under the balances 
of federalism, the separate states of the Union possess all of the pow­
ers of sovereignty that are not in confiict with the powers delegated 
by the United States Constitution to the federal government or pro­
hibited by that charter to the states.441 
This concept of federalism envisions a constitutional system 
providing for the exercise of both concurrent and exclusive powers 
by the federal government and by the states. Thus, pursuant to the 
principle of dual sovereignty, the national government remains 
supreme within the federal sphere, while each state retains its in­
dependent sovereignty and remains supreme within its own terri­
tory,442 subject to limited federal jurisdiction. In the criminal sphere, 
for example, the state, while pursuing and vindicating its separate 
governmental interests, may not interpret rights guaranteed by the 
United States Constitution more restrictively than the Supreme 
Court has interpreted them.443 
Prior to Mapp v. Ohio ,444 a majority of the states had not devel­
oped a substantial body of law governing search-and-seizure prac­
tices by law enforcement officers. With the advent of Mapp, and its 
insistence upon extending the federal exclusionary rule, announced 
in Weeks v. United States, 445 to state prosecutions,446 the state courts 
were confronted with the prospect of having to decide large numbers 
of complaints about the search-and-seizure practices of their police 
officers without a well-developed body of independent jurisprudence 
defining and governing the requirements of reasonableness under 
their own constitutions. The result was, as might be expected, an 
441. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 359-60 (1943); 2 C. ANTIEAU, MODERN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 10.1, at 4-5 (1969 & Supp. 1983). 
442. See 2 C. ANTiEAU, supra note 441, § 10.1, at 4-5; R. TRESOLINl, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 90-92 (1959). The principle of dual sovereignty is "inherent in 
odr federal system." Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U.S. 22, 29 (1977) (per curiam). 
443. See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714,719 n.4 (1975); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 
23, 34 (1963). 
A further restriction upon the power of the states arises where there exists an actual 
confiict between federal and state law, or where the federal government has preempted or 
occupied the field. In these situations, federal law is supreme. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 6-23 through 6-30 (1978). 
444. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
445. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). The Court in Weeks was careful to exclude the states 
and their officials from its precept. Id. at 398. 
446. 367 U.S. at 655-56. 
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inordinate reliance by state courts upon federal precedents, in partic­
ular the decisions of the Supreme Court.447 
These Court pronouncements, however, and in particular those 
ofthe Warren Court, were far more expansive of fourth amendment 
protections than what most state tribunals, with their tradition of ad­
mitting all relevant evidence no matter how obtained, were prepared 
to adopt on their own initiative. In seeking guidance from the na­
tion's highest court, some state tribunals may well have been con­
fused as to the duty of the Supreme Court in interpreting the 
commands of the federal Constitution. That duty, quite simply, re­
quires the Court to seek out and define only minimum standards of 
protection for individual rights.448 Consequently, the federal Consti­
tution, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, establishes minimum 
standards, and reserves to the states the right to impose higher stan­
dards on law enforcement practices pursuant to their own 
constitutions. 
While pronouncements of the Supreme Court are entitled to re­
spectful consideration, state courts retain their freedom of choice as 
to whether, under their respective constitutions, they should comport 
their decisions with federal law. In short, while this decision remains 
one of choice, it may not be compelled.449 Thus, the states are not 
precluded from imposing, as a matter of state law, higher standards 
on searches and seizures than are required by the fourth amend­
ment.4SO And, a number of states have elected to do SO.4SI 
447. Cf Developments in the Law-The Interpretation ofState Constitutional Rights, 
95 HARV. L. REV. 1324, 1370 (1982) (state courts usually interpret state constitutional 
protections exactly as the Supreme Court has interpreted corresponding federal 
guarantees). 
448. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 299, 300 (1982); People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 
528,545,531 P.2d 1099, 11I0, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315,326 (1975) (en banc); State v. Benoit, 
417 A.2d 895, 899 (R.I. 1980); J. HALL, supra note 28, § 23:6, at 655-56. 
449. See People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 548, 552, 531 P.2d 1099, l1I2, 11I4­
15,119 Cal. Rptr. 315, 328,330-31 (1975) (en banc). 
450. Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967) (dictum); see Oregon v. Hass, 420 
U.S. 714, 719 & n.4 (1975); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 175 (1969) (dictum); 
Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 60-61 (1968); Brennan, State Constitutions and the 
Protection ofIndividual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 498-504 (1977); see also Pruneyard 
Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980). 
451. Illustrative of this approach are: Waring v. State, 670 P.2d 357, 362-63 
(Alaska 1983) (refusing to follow restrictions on standing to assert the violation of a co­
defendant's fourth amendment rights imposed in Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 
165 (1969»; People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 545-52, 531 P.2d 1099, 1I10-15, 119 
Cal. Rptr. 315, 326-31 (1975) (en banc) (rejecting the standard governing the right to 
search incident to custodial arrest announced in United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 
(1973»; People v. Sporleder, 666 P.2d 135, 140-44 (Colo. 1983) (en banc) (disavowing the 
analysis in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979), that the installation and use of a pen 
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This result is not surprising. Not only were state constitutions 
intended to be documents of independent force and vitality, but also 
their historic roots reveal that the Bill of Rights was itself drafted on 
the basis of the corresponding provisions of the first state constitu­
tions.452 Thus, for example, protection against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, which later ripened into the fourth amend­
ment, had been embodied in all of those state constitutions adopted 
prior to 1789 that contained a separate bill of rights.453 
Although the United States Constitution was designed to secure 
the sovereign integrity and independence of states against the poten­
tial abuses of a centralized government, the state charters were con­
ceived as the first line of protection of individual rights against the 
excesses of local authorities. This dual sovereignty reflects a basic 
principle of federalism: that this nation as a whole is composed of 
register, on telephone company property, does not constitute a search within the meaning 
of the fourth amendment); People v. Beavers, 393 Mich. 554, 564-66, 227 N.W.2d 511, 
514-15 (en banc), cerro denied, 423 U.S. 878 (1975) (declining to follow United States v. 
White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (plurality opinion), which upheld the right of one party to a 
telephone conversation to consent to eavesdropping on the conversation); State v. Ball, 
34 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2272, 2273 (N.H. Dec. 12, 1983) (adopting a stricter standard 
governing the application of the plain view doctrine than that articulated in Texas v. 
Brown, 103 S. Ct. 1535 (1983) (plurality opinion»; State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 353-54, 
346 A.2d 66, 67-68 (1975) (refusing to follow Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 
(1973), regarding consent searches); People v. Gokey, 60 N.Y.2d 309, 312, 313-14, 457 
N.E.2d 723, 724-25, 469 N.Y.S.2d 618,619,620 (1983) (employing a stricter standard for 
searches incident to arrest than explicated in New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981»; 
Commonwealth v. Sell, 470 A.2d 457, 466-69 (Pa. 1983) (declining to adopt the analysis 
in United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980), abolishing automatic standing to sup­
press in possessory-offense cases); State v. Benoit, 417 A.2d 895, 899-901 (R.I. 1980) (re­
jecting the logic of Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), regarding the warrantless 
investigatory search of a motor vecicle stopped and seized on the highway and removed 
to a police station); State v. Opperman, 247 N.W.2d 673, 674-75 (S.D. 1976) (declining to 
follow South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976), regarding inventory searches of 
impounded motor vehicles); State v. Ringer, 674 P.2d 1240, 1242-43, 1247-48 (Wash. 
1983) (en banc) (rejecting the automobile exception to the warrant requirement as refined 
in United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982), and the search-incident-to-arrest rule de­
veloped in New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981»; see State v. Caraher, 293 Or. 741, 
653 P.2d 942, 947, 950-52 (1982) (en banc) (endorsing right to impose stricter standards 
on searches and seizures under state constitution than are required by federal Constitu­
tion, and creating such standards for searches incident to valid arrests). 
452. People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 549-50, 531 P.2d 1099, liB, 119 Cal. 
Rptr. 315, 329 (1975) (en banc); State v. Caraher, 293 Or. 741, - n.13, 653 P.2d 942, 950 
n.13 (1982) (en banc); see L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 102 (1973); B. 
SCHWARTZ, supra note 365, at 86-90; see also A. HOWARD, supra note 353, at 182-83, 205­
15, 231-40 (incorporation by state constitutions of many of the "rights of Englishmen" 
led to adoption of Bill of Rights; American constitutional law, as reflected in the state 
constitutions and the Bill of Rights, owes its origin to Magna Carta). 
453. People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 550, 531 P.2d 1099, liB, 119 Cal. Rptr. 
315,329 (1975) (en banc); see B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 365, at 86-90. 
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distinct political and geographic entities, bound together by a funda­
mental federal law, but remaining, nevertheless, independently re­
sponsible for safeguarding the rights of their respective citizens.454 
2. 	 A Call to the States to Reject the Implications of Gates 
and its Lower Standard 
After reading the majority opinion in Gates, one is left with the 
uneasy (one might even say, disturbing) impression that the real cul­
prit, in Justice Rehnquist's cast of characters, is not Aguilar-Spinelli 
or the standard for probable cause, or even the exclusionary rule, but 
rather, the fourth amendment itself; that to him, it is "a kind of nui­
sance, a serious impediment in the war against crime,"455 and func­
tions as a refuge for the guilty and the wrongdoers of American 
society. If this impression is accurate, then Justice Rehnquist mis­
construes the amendment's purpose and has seriously misread its 
history. 
In a sense, the fourth amendment does operate to protect the 
guilty; for when a criminal accused moves to suppress competent 
and relevant evidence, obtained in violation of his rights under the 
amendment, he is implicitly acknowledging that the evidence he is 
seeking to exclude from his trial is in fact inculpatory to him.456 But 
the fourth amendment protects more than just the guilty. It protects 
all persons - the innocent and the guilty - who have been sub­
jected to intrusions by means of unreasonable searches and seizures 
upon their security and legitimate expectations of privacy. Toward 
that end, it must be construed liberally to safeguard these precious 
rights.457 Justice Butler put the proposition in these terms: "The 
Amendment is to be liberally construed and all owe the duty of 
454. People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 550-51, 531 P.2d 1099, 1113-14, 119 Cal. 
Rptr. 315, 329-30 (1975) (en banc); see State v. Benoit, 417 A.2d 895, 899 (R.1. 1980). 
For further discussion of this issue, see Brennan, supra note 450; Howard, State 
Courts and Constitutional Righls in the Day of the Burger Court, 62 VA. L. REV. 873 
(1976); Walinski & Tucker, Expectations of Privacy: Fourth Amendment Legitimacy 
Through State Law, 16 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1981); Wilkes, More on the New 
Federalism in Criminal Procedure, 63 Ky. L.J. 873 (1975); Developments in the Law, supra 
note 447; Note, Stepping into the Breach: Basing Defendants' Rights on State Rather than 
Federal Law, 15 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 339 (1978). 
455. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 157 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
456. It would be a rare defendant, indeed, who would move to exclude exculpatory 
evidence. 
457. United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932); Go-Bart Importing Co. 
v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931); see Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 391­
92 (1914); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886). See generally Loewy, The 
Fourth Amendment as a Device for Protecling the Innocent, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1229 (1983). 
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vigilencefor its eff"ective enforcement lest there shall be impairment of 
the rights for the protection of which it was adopted."458 
There is good reason for this broad protection. As history 
teaches, arbitrary governments frequently resort to oppressive 
search-and-seizure practices to further the ends of tyranny at the ex­
pense of fundamental principles of liberty.459 Moreover, such prac­
tices are not unfamiliar to this country, and have been described in 
stark terms by Justice Jackson: 
[T]he right to be secure against searches and seizures is one of the 
most difficult to protect. Since the [law enforcement] officers are 
themselves the chief invaders, there is no enforcement outside of 
court. 
Only occasional and more flagrant abuses come to the atten­
tion of the courts, and then only those where the search and 
seizure yields incriminating evidence and the defendant is at least 
sufficiently compromised to be indicted. If the officers raid a 
home, an office, or stop and search an automobile but find nothing 
incriminating, this invasion of the personal1iberty of the innocent 
too often finds no practical redress. There may be, and I am con­
vinced that there are, many unlawful searches of homes and 
automobiles of innocent people which tum up nothing incriminat­
ing,. in which no arrest is made, about which courts do nothing, 
and about which we never hear. 
Courts can protect the innocent against such invasions only 
indirectly and through the medium of excluding evidence ob­
tained against those who frequently are guilty.46O 
As this passage demonstrates, the fourth amendment is not self­
executing and of necessity must rely upon the collective good judg­
ment of the courts to secure, for the overwhelming majority of inno­
cent citizens of this country, protection from arbitrary invasions of 
their peace and security by government agents. Thus, the courts 
must remain faithful to the great and enduring principles embodied 
in the fundamental law of the Land by insisting that the police com­
ply with the commands of the amendment.461 The vehicle adopted 
for securing this compliance is the exclusion of evidence obtained in 
458. Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931) (emphasis 
added). 
459. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180-81 (1949) (Jackson, J., 
dissenting). 
460. Id. at 181 (emphasis added); see Loewy, supra note 457, at 1269 (since pri­
mary purpose of fourth amendment ought to be protection of the innocent, the Supreme 
Court's principal focus should be on deterrent value of the exclusionary rule). 
461. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 391-93 (1914). 
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violation of the constitutional mandate,462 even if on occasion it re­
sults, as Justice Jackson acknowledged, in the acquittal of guilty 
persons.463 
Who is to say that this is too high a price to pay, when one 
considers the genesis of the fourth amendment? Men, such as John 
Adams, William Henry Drayton, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, 
George Mason, James Otis, and Oxenbridge Thacher, were not act­
ing as criminals and wrongdoers when they cried out against the 
abuses of the English crown. It was the outcry against these abuses 
that led to the Declaration of Independence and to the Constitution 
and the Bill of Rights. These men were all too familiar with the 
excesses employed by the monarchy, through the the dreaded and 
despised writs of assistance, not to know that the security and pri­
vacy of innocent persons were frequently invaded without just cause. 
Their knowledge was reflected in the fourth amendment, in its com­
mand against unreasonable searches and seizures, and in its insis­
tence that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."464 By 
means of these protections, the innocent would be secure from indis­
criminate general searches based only on suspicion, which, "[s]ince 
before the creation of our government, ... have been deemed ob­
noxious to fundamental principles of liberty."465 It is not surprising, 
therefore, that Justice Jackson protested that fourth amendment pro­
tections "are not mere second-class rights but belong in the catalog 
of indispensable freedoms. Among deprivations of rights, none is so 
effective in cowing a population, crushing the spirit of the individual 
and putting terror in every heart."466 
Justice Rehnquist's vision of the fourth amendment is both nar­
row and insensitive to the great principles of individual1iberty upon 
which the Bill of Rights is founded. There is, however, another vi­
sion of the fourth amendment, one that rejects Justice Rehnquist's 
interpretation. This view teaches that there is a spiritual underpin­
462. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347-48 (1974); Mapp, 367 U.S. at 
655-57 (exclusionary rule assures that "no man is to be convicted on unconstitutional 
evidence"; without the rule, the fourth amendment would be reduced to '''a form of 
words"'); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217-18, 222-24 (1960). 
463. See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 659 (while the rule of exclusion may result in the free­
ing of a criminal, "it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government 
more quickly than. . .its disregard of the charter of its own existence"). 
464. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
465. Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931). 
466. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
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ning to the fourth amendment - the belief that equates the value of 
the privacy and sanctity of person and home, supplemented by con­
stitutional protection against overreaching government, with the 
very value of human dignity itself. This belief, in sum, views the 
amendment as a fundamental restraint upon police conduct so as to 
preserve individual privacy and security except in cases of compel­
ling necessity, and then only under strict procedural safeguards.467 
Justice Brandeis stated this philosophy most cogently as "the right to 
be let alone - the most comprehensive of rights and the right most 
valued by civilized men."468 Thus, the principle function of the 
fourth amendment is to preserve "the privacy of a free people living 
free lives"469 from indiscriminate search-and-seizure practices by 
law enforcement officers. 
This clash of philosophies was most evident in Gates. The par­
ticular setting for this disagreement was the facial sufficiency of a 
supporting affidavit for a warrant based on hearsay evidence con­
tained in an anonymous informant's tip. The issue raised, however, 
far transcended the significance of its factual context, for what ulti­
mately was implicated in Gates was the continued vitality of the war­
rant machinery erected by the fourth amendment. 
The great, and enduring, purpose of the warrant requirement is 
to interPose a neutral and detached magistrate between the citizen 
and the police, so that an objective mind might assess the need of 
government agents to invade the individual's privacy in order to en­
force the law. In this way, the founders of our constitutional system 
of government believed that the individual's right to privacy and so­
ciety'S interest in reasonable security and freedom from official sur­
veillance could best be preserved and accomodated. Obviously, 
therefore, the role of the magistrate is central to this constitutional 
scheme, for he acts as a brake on the arbitrary practices of unscrupu­
lous law enforcement officers, thereby severely limiting the right of 
an officer to thrust himself into a home.47o At the core of this role is 
the magistrate's independence, for without this structural and mental 
integrity, all semblance of objectivity would quickly vanish, and the 
magistrate would become a deferential and pliable agent of the po­
lice. It is submitted that this is exactly the ,role that Justice Rehn­
467. J. LANDYNSKl, supra note 33, at 47. 
468. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
469. Amsterdam, supra note II, at 407. 
470. See McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-56 (1948); Johnson v. 
United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 
(1932); United States v. Bonfiglio, 713 F.2d 932, 935 (2d Cir. 1983). 
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quist's opinion in Gates envisions for the magistrate- one of 
subservience to law enforcement officers and their informants, one of 
deference to their superior knowledge and expertise in combating 
and rooting out crime. And, it is further submitted, it is precisely this 
ideology that the founders of this nation most abhorred and feared 
and sought to neutralize, not only by a system of checks and bal­
ances but also by means of the Bill of Rights, which was conceived 
as a collective limitation upon the exercise of power by government. 
The framers of the fourth amendment were not ignorant men. They 
did not bring second-class minds to the task of erecting an enduring 
charter of this nation's existence. Surely they must have been aware 
of the temptation to use the awesome power of government in fur­
therance of some "noble" cause, passionately perceived and warmly 
embraced by a current majority of the community. But just as surely, 
they saw the dangers of such a result, for once government is free of 
constitutional restraints and let loose on society, that society will be 
quickly cowed and crushed in spirit. Its members will become terror­
ized, their human personality diminished, and their dignity and self­
reliance destroyed. It is little wonder, therefore, that unrestricted 
search-and-seizure practices have become, in the words of Justice 
Jackson, "one of the first and most effective weapons in the arsenal 
of every arbitrary government."471 
Gates struck at the integrity and independence of the magis­
trate. It did this by downgrading the magistrate's central role in 
making determinations of probable cause and by encouraging the 
magistrate to abdicate his responsibility in the probable-cause pro­
cess by deferring to the judgments of police officers and their infor­
mants in the name of efficient law enforcement and common sense. 
A clue to Justice Rehnquist's thinking appeared when he im­
plicitly admonished magistrates not to insist upon a thorough detail­
ing of the basis of knowledge of an informant known for his 
"unusual reliability."472 The magistrate, under the new totality-of­
the-circumstances approach touted in Gates, is asked to trust to the 
informer's current reliability primarily, if not exclusive]y, on the ba­
sis of his past reliability. But, as Justice White was quick to point 
out, the past reliability of an informant is no more a barometer of 
current probable cause than is the previous trustworthiness of an ex­
471. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
472. 103 S. Ct. at 2329. 
1983) PROBABLE CAUSE AFTER GATES 409 

perienced and honest law enforcement officer.473 
Justice Rehnquist's approach differs from that of Justice White 
and ofAguilar-Spinelli by asking the magistrate to place undue em­
phasis upon the prior reliability of an informer in determining cur­
rent probable cause. Put another way, he is asking the magistrate to 
trust the source of the information, primarily on the basis of proven 
reliability, and if it satisfies the affiant-police officer, it will be suffi­
cient for the magistrate to find probable cause. The argument ap­
pears to be that the collective knowledge and expertise of law 
enforcement officers and their informants in combating crime are far 
superior and more trustworthy than that of mere magistrates. In this 
way, the integrity of the role of an independent judiciary in probable 
cause determinations and the warrant process will have been com­
promised, and the objective analysis required of a truly independent 
judicial officer will have been effectively subverted. 
Justice Brennan caught the drift of Justice Rehnquist's argu­
ment when he observed, with perception, that "[w]ords such as 'prac­
tical,' 'nontechnical,' and 'commonsense,' as used in the Court's 
opinion, are but code words for an overly permissive attitude to­
wards police practices in derogation of the rights secured by the 
[f]ourth [aJmendment."474 It was never the intent of the framers of 
the amendment, or of the Supreme Court itself, as reflected in its 
prior decisions, that practicality, common sense, and effective law 
enforcement were to take precedence per se over rights secured by 
the fourth amendment.475 The states should emphatically reject any 
such approach under their respective constitutions. They should in­
sist, at a minimum, that, as a prerequisite to the issuance of a war­
rant, a substantial showing of facts must be made from which an 
inference may be reasonably drawn that the informer is a credible 
person and that his information was obtained or gathered in a relia­
ble way. Any standard that does not require such a showing will 
result in an impairment of the rights secured by the fourth amend­
473. £d. at 2350 (White, J., concurring); Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 424-25 (White, J., 
concurring). 
474. 103 S. Ct. at 2359 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
For an example of Gales' implicit endorsement of the substantial, if not, in fact, 
primary role of law enforcement expertise in assessments of probable cause, and its im­
pact upon an evaluation of innocent-appearing activity, see United States v. Mendoza, 
722 F.2d 96, 101-02 (5th Cir. 1983). 
475. See, e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978) ("mere fact that law 
enforcement may be made more efficient can never by itself justify disregard of the 
[flourth [a)mendment"). 
410 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:331 
ment.476 Making it easier to obtain a warrant may simplify and ex­
pedite the investigation of crime, but it is not the way for 
constitutional government to go, and Justice Stewart has told us 
why: "[T]he [flourth [a]mendment reflects the view of those who 
wrote the Bill of Rights that the privacy of a person's home and 
property may not be totally sacrificed in the name of maximum sim­
plicity [and expediency] in enforcement of the criminallaw."477 
Ultimately, the focus of judicial inquiry should not be on such 
subjective factors as the expertise and wisdom of law enforcement 
officers and their informers, common sense, practicality, and efficient 
and simplified law enforcement, but rather on an objective analysis 
of the information contained in the supporting affidavit so as to 
make a proper determination of probable cause. In this way, the 
magistrate will be effectively discharging his duty of determining 
whether the constitutional rights of the individual who is subject to 
the warrant will be violated if the warrant is issued. Justice Rehn­
quist was correct when he implied that there is no magic formula for 
accomplishing this.478 Certainly, as he suggested, there is an interre­
lationship between the Aguilar-Spinelli basis-of-knowledge and ve­
racity prongs.479 Therefore, there is merit to the argument that the 
Aguilar-Spinelli rules were not the last word on the troublesome sub­
ject of properly assessing the probable cause sufficiency of infor­
mants' tips, and that a rigid application of this analysis could 
seriously hamper effective law enforcement without materially in­
creasing constitutional protections.48o But after this much is ac­
knowledged, the fact remains that the magistrate must still be 
476. See Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2350 (White, J., concurring in the judgment). This 
may be done, for example, by means of the informant's personal observation of the infor­
mation imparted in his report, or a showing that the informer's hearsay came from one of 
the actors in the crime in the nature of an admission against penal interest, or self-verify­
ing detail in the tip sufficient to infer an adequate basis of knowledge, or substantial 
corroboration or verification of the report's contents. 
One court has attempted to put a limiting construction on Gates: Commonwealth v. 
Upton, 390 Mass. 562, 568-74,458 N.E.2d 717, 720-24 (1983). The problem with any such 
assessment, however, is that the Supreme Court is the final arbiter of its own pronounce­
ments. Moreover, one may assume that the Court chooses the language contained in its 
rulings with care. Thus, interpreting a Supreme Court decision by choosing to ignore part 
of the language contained in that decision, as the Upton court did, could prove to be of 
dubious, as well as of limited, precedential value. The better approach, it is submitted, is 
for a state court to recognize and appreciate the full implications of Gates, and to reject 
it under the authority of the applicable state constitution. 
477. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978). 
478. See Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2328-29. 
479. See id. at 2329. 
480. See id. at 2330-32; id at 2350-51 (White, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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presented with a showing of facts that is sufficient for him to reason­
ably infer that the informer is a credible person who gathered his 
information in a reliable way. Otherwise, warrants will issue "on 
loose, vague or doubtful bases of fact,"481 and will expose the indi­
vidual and his home to search on mere suspicion. 
Similarly, the states should emphatically reject any suggestion 
of Justice Rehnquist's that probable cause should be conceptualized 
in terms of suspicion, reasonable or otherwise. While retaining its 
label, Justice Rehnquist has attempted to change the meaning of 
probable cause. By so doing, he has embarked on a path that runs 
counter to the legal traditions of this country, and has struck at the 
very concept of the fourth amendment. For if the amendment stands 
for anything, it is that government must act with prudence and re­
straint in moving against the individual, and then only upon just 
cause. 
The history of the fourth amendment demonstrates that the 
standard of suspicion has never been considered an adequate or just 
cause for government to intrude upon the individual's zone of pri­
vacy by means of a warrant. Probable cause has always been the 
standard under the warrant clause of the amendment by which pri­
vacy is reasonably invaded. This command is central to the warrant 
requirement, and represents the historical genesis of the fourth 
amendment. To equate probable cause with suspicion is to stand 
history on its head and to expose the individual and the privacies of 
his life to the discretionary mercy of law enforcement officers. 
The fact that this is being proposed in the name of effective law 
enforcement and common sense is of no moment. The message 
coming from Gates may have been sugarcoated and served up under 
the least obnoxious banner of efficient law enforcement and practi­
cality. But once Justice Rehnquist's opinion is stripped of its grace­
ful style and palatable call for a more effective war on crime, what is 
revealed is a message of bitter antagonism toward the warrant re­
quirement, the standard of probable cause, and, above all else, the 
fourth amendment itself. It is the duty of the states, as it befell them 
once before prior to the establishment of the federal Constitution, to 
resist this message of hate, and to preserve to their citizens what this 
country fought in revolution to achieve: the dignity and privacy of 
the individual, secure from arbitrary government. 
As Henry v. United States482 taught, and as Dunaway v. New 
481. Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931). 
482. 361 U.S. 98 (1959). 
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York 483 confirmed, the requirement of probable cause "has roots 
that are deep in our history."484 Those roots, however, have always 
rejected any attempt to equate suspicion with probable cause. Thus, 
history has revealed that "[h]ostility to [searches or] seizures based 
on mere suspicion was a prime motivation for the adoption of the 
[ijourth [a]mendment,"485 and decisions immediately after its adop­
tion affirmed that "common rumor or report, suspicion, or even 
'strong reason to suspect' was not adequate to support a warrant for 
arrest [or to search]. And that principle has survived to this day."486 
The core principles of fourth amendment jurisprudence reveal a 
deep-rooted commitment of this nation to a standard of probable 
cause that is superior to the concept of suspicion. We, as a people, 
had paid too high a price to rid ourselves of arbitrary government 
and its inevitable excesses only to have then turned around and 
adopted for ourselves a standard governing search-and-seizure prac­
tices that would have effectively undercut the very principles that 
gave birth to freedom in this country, and would have left the secur­
ity and privacy of the individual at the mercy of petty officers of the 
state.487 
Justice Rehnquist, as a member of the Supreme Court, had to 
be familiar with this history, and was certainly charged with knowl­
edge of the Court's pronouncements on this subject. Both Henry and 
IJunaway have been and remain good law, and, he must have 
known this when he authored the majority opinion in Gates. The 
conclusion is inescapable that he intentionally introduced the con­
cept of suspicion into probable cause analysis for the purpose of lay­
ing the foundation for the eventual lowering of the standard of 
probable cause. If he is successful in this, he will have effectively 
diminished the right of the people to be secure in their persons and 
homes against unreasonable searches and seizures. The net result 
will be to reduce the fourth amendment to a "form of words,"488 and 
to render its protections as "secondary rights, to be relegated to a 
deferred position. "489 
The states should be no party to such an insidious attempt to 
483. 442 U.S. 200 (1979). 
484. Henry, 361 U.S. at 100; accord, IJunaway, 442 U.S. at 213. 
485. IJunaway, 442 U.S. at 213. 
486. Henry, 361 U.S. at 101 (footnote omitted). 
487. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 389-92. 
488. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920) (Holmes, 
J.) (citing Weeks, 232 U.S. at 393); see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12 (1968); Mapp, 367 
U.S. at 655. 
489. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
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undercut the principles that gave birth to this nation. The standard 
of probable cause is no formality. It serves a high function and de­
fines the criteria for the reasonable invasion of privacy. The stan­
dard was selected not to shield criminals but to protect the innocent 
from arbitrary intrusions by agents of the govequnent. The right of 
privacy was deemed too precious to be subject to the dangers inher­
ent in a standard governed by the principles of suspicion. Power has 
a heady effect; and history has shown that the police, acting pursuant 
to a standard of suspicion, cannot be trusted. Against such a perni­
cious doctrine, a state court "should resolutely set its face."49o 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This article ends where, in a very real sense, it began: with Boyd 
v. United States,491 "[t]he leading case on the subject of search and 
seizure,"492 and which ''will be remembered as long as civil liberty 
lives in the United States."493 Writing nearly one hundred years 
ago, Justice Bradley placed the courts of this nation under a charge 
to protect fundamental rights in terms that proved to be prophetic: 
It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least 
repulsive form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get 
their first footing in that way, namely, by silent approaches and 
slight deviations from legal modes of procedure. This can only be 
obviated by adhering to the rule that constitutional provisions for 
the security of person and property should be liberally construed. 
A close and literal construction deprives them of half their effi­
cacy, and leads to gradual depreciation of the right, as if it con­
sisted more in sound than in substance. It is the duty of courts to be 
watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against 
any stealthy encroachments thereon.494 
It is submitted, in conclusion, that the state courts remain under 
this charge, and should take up the call of Boyd "to be watchful for 
the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy en­
croachments thereon," by rejecting the message emanating from 
Gates. Suspicion must never be the standard of probable cause, and 
no warrant should issue on the basis of hearsay evidence contained 
in an informant's tip without a substantial factual basis to support a 
490. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
491. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
492. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 147; accord, One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 
380 U.S. 693, 696 (1965). 
493. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
494. 116 U.S. at 635 (emphasis added). 
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reasonable inference that the informer is a credible person who has 
obtained his information in a reliable way. To permit suspicion to 
be the standard by which privacy may be invaded, or to sanction the 
issuance of a warrant on less than a substantial factual basis to sup­
port a reasonable inference that an informant is a credible person 
who has gathered his information in a trustworthy manner, will re­
sult in an evisceration of the probable cause standard and an impair­
ment of the rights secured by the fourth amendment. 
